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Dynamic Surveillance:  
Evolving Procedures in Metadata and Foreign 
Content Collection After Snowden 
Peter Margulies* 
This Article outlines a dynamic conception of national security surveillance that 
justifies programs disclosed by Edward Snowden but calls for greater transparency and 
accountability in the wake of Snowden’s revelations. The dynamic conception supports 
the legality of section 215 of the USA Patriot Act and section 702 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”), programs that received informed input from all 
three branches of government. Each program is part of a long democratic experiment 
in the integration of secrecy, deliberation, and strategic advantage that dates to the 
Constitution’s framing. Both programs reflect Congress’s concern that intelligence 
collection be sufficiently agile to keep up with evolving threats. The Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) required that both programs use technology 
not only to collect data, but also to prevent unduly intrusive government use of that 
data. However, even though both section 215 and section 702 were legal in their pre-
Snowden iterations, changes are now necessary to ensure the programs’ legitimacy.  
 
Legislation sponsored by Senator Patrick Leahy modifies section 215 by leaving private 
data in the hands of telecommunications companies and authorizes the FISC to appoint 
amici to represent the public interest. On the FISC process front, the Leahy bill is a 
welcome first step, but does not go far enough. A more robust public advocate whose 
participation does not require permission by the FISC would provide a more 
meaningful check on the government. This Article argues that a more robust public 
advocate could withstand constitutional objections based on Article III and the 
Appointments Clause of the Constitution, and enhance domestic and international faith 
in the FISC’s deliberations. 
 
 * Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. B.A. 1978, Colgate University; 
J.D. 1981, Columbia Law School. I thank reference librarians Nan Balliot and Emilie Benoit for their 
expert assistance, and Joe Landau, David Pozen, and Ben Wittes for comments on a previous draft. 
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Introduction 
As President Obama noted in a January 2014 speech,1 American 
leaders’ quest for intelligence about adversaries’ plans started with Paul 
Revere’s fabled midnight ride in 1775.2 Public disclosure of Revere’s 
method would have robbed the colonists of a strategic advantage and 
limited their options in the impending revolution against British rule. 
Such consequences do not justify unlimited secrecy or unchecked 
intelligence collection. However, they demonstrate that current efforts to 
reform intelligence gathering after Edward Snowden’s revelations 
require great care. This Article argues that a dynamic conception of 
collection and surveillance authorities can pivot toward greater 
transparency and accountability, while preserving the effectiveness of 
intelligence programs. 
Revere’s example sets the stage for important insights about two 
controversial programs that figured prominently in Snowden’s 
disclosures: the bulk collection of telephony “metadata” under section 
215 of the USA Patriot Act,3 pursuant to orders issued by the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”),4 and the collection of Internet 
and telephony content under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (“FISA”).5 
With respect to section 215, critics have argued that the FISC erred 
in finding that the National Security Agency (“NSA”) could acquire, 
albeit with substantial conditions regarding access, the call records of 
millions of Americans with no connection to terrorism.6 According to 
critics, the bulk collection of metadata that the FISC had approved 
before Snowden’s revelations was far too sweeping to be “relevant to an 
authorized investigation” of international terrorism or foreign 
 
 1. See Barack Obama, President of the United States, Speech on NSA Reforms (Jan. 17, 2014), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of-president-obamas-jan-17-speech-on-
nsa-reforms/2014/01/17/fa33590a-7f8c-11e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html. 
 2. Revere advised a fellow patriot in April 1775 to place one lantern in the steeple of Boston’s 
North Church if the British were planning to take a land route to Lexington and Concord to destroy 
the colonists’ arms caches, and two lanterns if the British were planning to cross the Charles River to 
points north. See Jayne E. Triber, A True Republican: The Life of Paul Revere 102 (1998) (relating 
the story of Paul Revere’s ride and describing Revere as “an experienced courier and spy”). 
 3. 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2011). 
 4. See, e.g., In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things 
from [Name Redacted by Court], No. BR 06-05, 2006 WL 7137486 (FISA Ct. May 24, 2006). 
 5. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2011). 
 6. See Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional 
Considerations, 37 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 757, 821 (2014); Marty Lederman, The Kris Paper, and the 
Problematic FISC Opinion on the Section 215 “Metadata” Collection Program, Just Security (Oct. 1, 
2013, 5:25 PM), http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/01/kris-paper-legality-section-215-metadata-collection/; 
cf. Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and the Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 102 Geo. L.J. 1721, 1754–58 (2014) (noting critics’ contentions that the FISC has not 
adequately constrained the executive branch). 
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intelligence activity under section 215.7 Critics have asserted that the 
FISC should have employed a far narrower definition of relevance that 
precluded bulk collection. Regarding section 702, critics have argued that 
the FISC erred in permitting collection of content “about” targets, 
instead of limiting collection to communications to and from targets.8 In 
addition, critics have been troubled by the FISC’s use of search terms 
related to U.S. persons to query data that was collected pursuant to 
statutory authorization of foreign surveillance.9 On a broader theoretical 
level, NSA critics argue that the secrecy surrounding the FISC’s 
decisions, the absence of a voice opposing the government’s FISC 
applications, and the lack of public debate in Congress prior to 
Snowden’s revelations corroded decisionmaking and eroded the checks 
that a public and adversarial process provide.10 
While the critics’ concerns are legitimate, their argument 
incorporates an unduly stark account of the relationship between 
government secrecy and two core values in national security surveillance: 
deliberation and strategic advantage. Secrecy here refers to protection 
against public disclosure of a program, position, or technique.11 
Deliberation refers to the classical virtue celebrated by the Framers of 
dialogue on problems and prospective solutions.12 Strategic advantage 
refers to the edge that a state obtains over its adversaries, including other 
states or non-state actors.13 Critics assert that in conditions of secrecy, 
strategic advantage assumes outsized importance, leading to the 
 
 7. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2) (2011). 
 8. See Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and 
Internet Content, 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 58), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2436418. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See David Cole, Can Privacy Be Saved?, N.Y. Rev. Bks., Mar. 6, 2014, at 23; Ryan Lizza, State 
of Deception: Why Won’t the President Rein in the Intelligence Community?, The New Yorker, Dec. 16, 
2013, at 48 (summarizing views of legislative critics of metadata program, particularly Oregon Senator 
Ron Wyden); cf. David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 257, 278, 282–83, 287 (2010) (analyzing 
secrecy’s risks and benefits, and cautioning about one aspect of its potential effect on decisionmaking). 
 11. Pozen, supra note 10; Jared Cole, Note, Historical Gloss and Congressional Power: Control 
Over Access to National Security Secrets, 98 Va. L. Rev. 1855, 1864–70 (2013). 
 12. See The Federalist No. 63, at 384 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (citing the 
importance of designing institutions such as Senate that will enable “cool and deliberate sense of the 
community” to prevail over “temporary errors and delusions”); cf. Hannah Arendt, Between Past 
and Future 242 (Penguin Books 1977) (1961) (noting process through which “an issue is forced into 
the open that it may show itself from all sides, in every possible perspective”). The Framers were 
profoundly influenced by the classical civic humanist tradition of political deliberation that also shaped 
Arendt’s thought. See J.L. Hill, The Five Faces of Freedom in American Political and Constitutional 
Thought, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 499, 582–83 (2004); Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 Yale L.J. 1493, 
1495 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L.J. 1539, 1547–50 (1988). 
 13. See The Federalist No. 41, supra note 12, at 257 (James Madison) (noting risks that arise 
because the Constitution cannot “chain the ambition or set bounds to the exertions of all other 
nations,” requiring institutional design to respond to those risks). 
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evisceration of checks and balances that ensure deliberation and protect 
individual rights. 
This Article argues that a “dynamic conception” of surveillance 
authorities would better integrate secrecy, deliberation, and strategic 
advantage. The dynamic conception posits that, in the realm of national 
security surveillance, changing circumstances will affect the appropriate 
mix of secrecy and deliberation. To qualify as dynamic under this 
conception, the mix of secrecy and deliberation must involve all three 
branches of government, not unilateral action by the executive branch. A 
default position of secret deliberation among the three branches may be 
appropriate. Because of the rapidly changing nature of external threats, 
including terrorism, Congress may choose, in the first instance, to limit 
public disclosure of certain surveillance techniques that give officials the 
agility to anticipate and meet those threats. Congress can also choose to 
give a tribunal, such as the FISC, the ability to approve ex parte requests 
from officials to utilize new technologies under a broad legal standard, 
even without express congressional authorization for such new 
technologies. At the same time, as part of this shared understanding, 
Congress will expect that the FISC and the agency conducting collection 
or surveillance use evolving technology to limit the ways the government 
uses the data that it has collected. Moreover, this default understanding 
of the need for secrecy may itself change, as public disclosure, such as 
Snowden’s, diminishes the perceived legitimacy of government 
surveillance and collection programs. In this new environment, bolstering 
legitimacy is crucial, and steps that emphasize transparency, external 
constraints on collection and surveillance, and tailoring surveillance to 
the public interest will assume priority. 
On this view, secrecy and deliberation can be complementary. 
Deliberation entails choice. In national security and foreign affairs, as the 
Framers understood, secrecy can expand the menu of options. Public 
disclosure, in contrast, makes certain options ineffective, removing them 
from deliberation’s reach.14 Suppose that a diplomat wished to travel to a 
country that was a long-time adversary to negotiate an agreement. 
Premature disclosure of the trip would galvanize domestic distrust of the 
adversary’s motives, removing any hope of the agreement.15 Premature 
 
 14. See Rahul Sagar, Secrets and Leaks: The Dilemma of State Secrecy 2 (2013) (noting that 
“citizens may themselves prefer secrecy when it leads to the execution of worthy policies that cannot 
otherwise be carried out”); Dennis F. Thompson, Democratic Secrecy, 114 Pol. Sci. Q., no. 2, 1999, at 
182 (without secrecy, some policies “to which citizens would consent if they had the opportunity” 
“could not be carried out as effectively or at all”). 
 15. See Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life 176 (1978) (suggesting that 
concealing a trip and even issuing a “cover story” claiming that the diplomat was on another mission 
could be a permissible “white lie,” but urging that such tactics be reduced to “an absolute minimum”). 
Margulies_20 (Teixeira CORRECTED).DOC (Do Not Delete) 11/26/2014 2:21 PM 
6 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66: 1 
disclosure would also neutralize any long-term strategic advantage that 
an agreement would yield. 
Of course, secrecy is not a panacea. In our diplomacy scenario, an 
enemy might use negotiations as a ruse to buy time for fresh attacks.16 
Wider discussion might have headed off this catastrophe. However, 
unless we wish to categorically rule out negotiations with long-time foes, 
we should acknowledge that secrecy will sometimes expand the realm of 
the possible. One challenge in such cases is to build in checks and 
balances for a secret process that will replicate the virtues of broad 
disclosure without its risks. An additional challenge is coping with 
unauthorized disclosures, like Snowden’s, which put a premium on 
demonstrations of the system’s legitimacy. The ultimate test of the 
dynamic conception is signaling legitimacy while maintaining 
effectiveness in the wake of such revelations. 
We can trace the dynamic conception back to the value placed on 
secrecy in national security and foreign affairs by the Constitution’s 
Framers. This more favorable view of secrecy has also been a mainstay of 
judicial precedent, driving decisions on state secrets,17 government 
employment,18 and remedies.19 The development of increasingly 
sophisticated technology has accelerated the trend, although courts have 
tempered this tendency with an awareness of individual rights.20 
Applied to section 215, the dynamic conception’s premise is that 
Congress intended to keep the statutory relevance standard fluid to 
accommodate changes in technology, as well as the terrorist threat, while 
maintaining appropriate privacy safeguards. To fulfill those purposes, 
Congress drafted section 215 to permit broad collection, narrow but 
consistent congressional oversight, and judicial imposition of rigorous 
search protocols that limit NSA access to the bulk telephony database. 
 
 16. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 37 (2010) (noting that a violent non-
state actor could “pursue peaceful negotiation as a means of buying time to recover from short-term 
setbacks, lulling opponents into complacency, and ultimately preparing for renewed attacks”). 
 17. See, e.g., Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875) (holding that the need for government 
secrecy barred a suit by an alleged government agent regarding compensation for a secret mission 
during the Civil War). 
 18. See, e.g., Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (holding that the importance of 
secrecy required limiting the remedies available to an employee seeking to contest discharge that 
occurred pursuant to loss of required security clearance). 
 19. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (cautioning against litigation 
that would result in second-guessing “complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the 
composition, training, equipping, and controlling of a military force” (citing Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 
U.S. 1, 10 (1973))).  
 20. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (holding that warrantless digital search of 
suspect’s cell phone was not covered by search incident to arrest doctrine); United States v. Jones, 132 
S. Ct. 945 (2012) (limiting warrantless GPS tracking); cf. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment 
Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 476, 487–90 (2011) (outlining the model of 
courts’ responses to technological change). 
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“About” collection under section 702 does not require the same 
interpretive leap as authorizing bulk metadata collection under section 
215, since it hinges on the definition of the statutory term “target,” which 
can readily encompass the collection of communications about a 
particular subject. Critics argue that each reading took interpretive 
liberties. However, their narrow reading of each statute is not the only 
account worthy of consideration. 
Critics often pay insufficient heed to the fiduciary dimensions of 
secrecy and information collection. When an entity such as a labor union 
or the federal government invites the trust of its members or 
constituents,21 the entity takes on corresponding obligations. For 
example, labor unions must fairly represent their members.22 Federal 
officials must, within the bounds of the Constitution, provide for the 
safety and defense of U.S. persons from foreign and domestic threats.23 
As precedents from U.S. law and history demonstrate,24 secrecy has 
often been a vital asset in meeting those obligations. While a fiduciary 
must often keep information secret, she must also acquire information25 
about threats to her stakeholders.26 To that end, the Supreme Court has 
held that a union can obtain information that is “of use to the union in 
carrying out its statutory duties and responsibilities.”27 
Both bulk collection of metadata under section 215 and foreign 
content collection under section 702 served this fiduciary goal. While the 
metadata program’s benefits were more diffuse, it allowed the 
government to quickly and reliably map out the contacts of known 
terrorist entities and operatives.28 That capability generated investigative 
leads, even granting critics’ contention that the program did not by itself 
foil a specific attack.29 Moreover, the program played a useful role in 
allocating government resources. In chaotic situations, such as the 
aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing, the program enabled 
investigators to discern early on that the Tsarnaev brothers acted without 
foreign assistance, freeing officials to concentrate on the domestic 
 
 21. See Ethan J. Leib et al., A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 Calif. L. Rev. 699, 705–13 (2013) 
(discussing attributes of fiduciaries). 
 22. See Vaca v. Snipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). 
 23. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 59 (1890). 
 24. See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 11 (2005). 
 25. See NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437 (1967). 
 26. Cf. Peter Margulies, Advising Terrorism: Material Support, Safe Harbors, and Freedom of 
Speech, 63 Hastings L.J. 455, 473–75 (2012) (discussing Founding Era views of risks posed by 
asymmetries in information between nations). 
 27. Acme, 385 U.S. at 437. 
 28. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 29. See Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Report on the Telephone Records Program 
Conducted Under Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act and on the Operations of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court 150 (Jan. 23, 2014) [hereinafter PCLOB Section 215 Report]. 
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realm.30 Even critics of the metadata program have agreed that section 
702 has assisted the government in obtaining information “efficiently and 
effectively about foreign targets overseas.”31 
A fiduciary’s power to obtain information is subject to vital 
restraints. The executive branch typically must act within a framework 
created by its co-equal political branch, Congress.32 Such constraints also 
shape the metadata program. In section 215, Congress required that the 
executive request information through the FISC, which authorized 
queries of metadata only with a small set of call numbers for which the 
agency had a “reasonable, articulable suspicion” of links to terrorism.33 
This particularized search protocol matched approaches that courts have 
required in the approval of warrants to search digital information.34 In 
addition, the Department of Justice had to provide regular updates to 
both the intelligence and judiciary committees of the Senate and House 
of Representatives.35 While not all members of Congress availed 
themselves of the information the government proffered, the information 
was sufficient to fuel eloquent critiques of the program from engaged 
legislators.36 
As with any safeguards, such protections prove themselves not in 
text or theory but in the situation “on the ground.” From the metadata 
program’s inception in mid-2006 to early 2009, the NSA did not comply 
with the particularized search constraints imposed by the FISC. 
However, once the Justice Department learned of this serious 
compliance issue and alerted the FISC, the court imposed a rigorous 
remedial regime that brought the NSA into compliance.37 That 
compliance regime included automated controls on NSA searches and 
regular reporting to the FISC. Government disclosures to Congress were 
 
 30. See President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Commc’ns Techs., Liberty and 
Security in a Changing World 104 (Dec. 12, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf. 
 31. Id. at 144; cf. Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Bd., Report on the Surveillance 
Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 93 
(July 2, 2014) [hereinafter PCLOB Section 702 Report]. 
 32. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); 
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An 
Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, in The Constitution in Wartime: Beyond 
Alarmism and Complacency 171, 173–76 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005) (arguing that courts defer more to 
executive decisions on national security when the President acts with Congress’s support). 
 33. See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from 
[Name Redacted by Court], No. BR 06-05, 2006 WL 7137486, at *2 (FISA Ct. May 24, 2006). 
 34. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 35. 50 U.S.C. § 1871(a)(4)–(5) (2014). 
 36. See Lizza, supra note 10, at 59. 
 37. See In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [Name Redacted by Court], No. BR 08-13, 2009 
WL 9150913, at *5-10 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009). 
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adequate, although the written disclosures exhibited an unhelpful 
tendency to blame mistakes on machines, not people.38 
Now that Snowden’s revelations have mooted some of the secrecy 
surrounding both section 215 and section 702, the dynamic conception 
encompasses reforms that stress tailoring of surveillance and the optimal 
balance of external and internal constraints. Those constraints should 
include a robust public advocate at the FISC. That public advocate could 
help ensure that the NSA faithfully implements any congressional 
changes to the section 215 program, such as requirements that would 
keep call records with phone carriers and permit the government to ask 
the FISC to order the carriers to produce information based on a 
“specific selection term.”39 A public advocate could also ensure that 
“about” collection under section 702 can remain tailored, and can ensure 
more specific criteria for U.S. person queries of section 702 data. 
A July 2014 compromise reform package negotiated by Senator 
Patrick Leahy of Vermont and executive branch representatives40 
includes significant improvements to tailoring and external constraints, 
although it fails to embrace an institutionalized public advocate. The 
USA Freedom Act introduced by Senator Leahy (the “Leahy bill”), 
which is likely to be the template for legislation enacted by Congress, 
tightens requirements for government requests for metadata and 
authorizes the FISC to appoint amici curiae to advocate for privacy and 
civil liberties. It also permits the FISC to certify legal questions to the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (“FISCR”), and in 
turn, authorizes the FISCR to certify legal questions to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. It is not clear, however, that the changes wrought by the Leahy 
bill, if enacted into law, will produce the desired results. 
This Article argues that, as is perhaps inevitable in a compromise, 
the Leahy bill makes progress toward reform but will produce less 
positive change than its drafters hoped. The definition of the “specific 
selection term” that the government must cite to gain access to metadata 
may prompt unduly narrow judicial interpretations. I argue that courts 
should read the definition to permit access to data that the government 
can currently request through ordinary means, such as grand jury 
subpoenas. In contrast to the tightening of section 215, the Leahy bill 
 
 38. See Ronald Weich, Report on the NSA’s Bulk Collection Programs Affected by USA 
PATRIOT Act Reauthorization 4 (Dec. 14, 2009), available at http://www.emptywheel.net/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/091214-FISA-Cover-Letter-to-Reyes.pdf. 
 39. See USA FREEDOM Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. § 101(a)(3) (as passed by H.R., May 22, 2014). 
 40. See USA FREEDOM Act of 2014, S. 2685, 113th Cong. (introduced July 30, 2014), entitled 
“A bill introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy, et al., to reform the authorities of the Federal 
Government to require the production of certain business records, conduct electronic surveillance, use 
pen registers and trap and trace devices, and use other forms of information gathering for foreign 
intelligence, counterterrorism, and criminal purposes, and for other purposes.” 
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makes no substantive changes to the section 702 program to further limit 
NSA analysts’ access to U.S. person data, although some changes would 
enhance the long-term legitimacy of section 702. The Leahy bill’s 
institutional reforms, while salutary in a number of respects, do not go 
far enough. The amicus curiae approach hinges on FISC appointment of 
amici, which may flounder because of the FISC’s skepticism about an 
adversarial process. Certification, which has fallen into disuse at the 
Supreme Court, may also fail to provide the effective resolution of legal 
issues that reformers desire. 
One brake on more far-reaching institutional reform has been 
concern that changes could trigger problems under Article III’s “case 
and controversy” requirement and the Appointments Clause in Article 
II. In particular, some have worried that a robust public advocate would 
press for a discussion of broad legal or policy matters, without the 
individualized stake that is required by Article III, and that the 
appointment of a public advocate by the courts would raise 
Appointments Clause issues.41 A dynamic conception would reject those 
formalistic arguments. This Article argues that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. United States District Court (Keith),42 which 
invited action by Congress that eventually led to FISA, gives Congress 
substantial latitude in fashioning institutional reforms. 
In Keith and in Morrison v. Olson,43 which upheld Congress’s 
enactment of the independent counsel statute after the crisis of 
confidence brought on by Watergate, the Court eschewed formalism and 
deferred to efforts by Congress to remedy perceived failures of 
deliberation. That approach mirrors the historic place of ex parte 
warrant applications under Article III. As the Justice Department’s 
Office of Legal Counsel told Congress before it enacted FISA, the 
manifest need for independent review of warrant applications has always 
trumped a formalistic reading of Article III exercise of judicial power. 
The Court would approach new reforms to the FISA process in the same 
manner, as measures designed to enhance the independence of the 
judiciary and signal the legitimacy of surveillance efforts. 
This Article is divided into five parts. Part I outlines the operation 
of the metadata program and section 702. Parts II–IV address the 
metadata program. Part II analyzes ambiguity in section 215’s text. Part 
III argues that the fiduciary conception of relevance is a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute, especially in light of the history of 
 
 41. See Andrew Nolan et al., Cong. Research Serv., R43260, Reform of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Courts: Introducing a Public Advocate (Mar. 21, 2014); Orin Kerr, 
Article III Problems with Appellate Review in the Leahy Bill?, Lawfare (July 30, 2014), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/07/article-iii-problems-with-appellate-review-in-the-leahy-bill/. 
 42. 407 U.S. 297, 306–08 (1972). 
 43. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
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government secrecy and technology in national security matters. Part IV 
considers the metadata program’s pre-Snowden operation, noting its 
“trial by fire” in 2009 when the government disclosed the NSA’s 
noncompliance with the FISC’s conditions. Part V discusses the post-
Snowden landscape, suggesting that tailoring and external constraints 
shape the analysis of the Leahy bill and other proposed changes to 
section 215 and section 702. 
I.  The Statutory Framework 
Our inquiry starts with the statutory provisions at issue: section 215 
of the USA Patriot Act and section 702 of FISA. This Part discusses the 
statutes’ text, the relevant case law, and the operation of the activities 
that courts have authorized under each provision. 
A. Section 215 
1. Text and Case Law 
Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act, as amended in 2006, allows the 
government to obtain, with court approval, records, and tangible things 
that are “relevant to an authorized investigation . . . to protect against 
international terrorism.”44 The “relevance standard” revised language 
from the original Patriot Act of 2001, passed shortly after the September 
11 attacks, which, with court approval, permitted the government to 
obtain tangible things “sought . . . in an investigation.” Congress added 
the relevance standard for clarity, but legislative history indicates that by 
making this change, Congress did not wish to alter the government’s 
access to information.45 
All government applications under section 215 go to the FISC, a 
court comprised of a rotating group of Article III judges appointed by 
the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Most of the FISC’s docket 
involves applications that the government makes ex parte, just as warrant 
applications by state, local, and federal law enforcement officials have 
been made for over two centuries.46 Often, the government makes a 
 
 44. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2006). The statute lists “presumptively relevant” items including 
those pertaining to a foreign power or “agent of a foreign power,” the “activities” of said agent, or “an 
individual in contact with, or known to, a suspected agent of a foreign power.” Id. § 1861(b)(2)(A)(i)–
(iii). In addition, the NSA collects the content of communications in which at least one party is a non-
U.S. person reasonably believed to be located abroad when the surveillance will result in acquiring 
foreign intelligence information. See FISA Amendments Act of 2008 § 702, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2014). 
Discussion of section 702 and human rights is beyond the scope of this Article. For analysis, see Peter 
Margulies, The NSA in Global Perspective: Surveillance, Human Rights, and Int’l Counterterrorism, 
82 Fordham L. Rev. 2137 (2014). 
 45. H.R. Rep. No. 109-333, at 11302 (2005) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that the change was not intended 
to “prevent the FBI from obtaining tangible items that it can currently obtain”). 
46. Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972). 
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preliminary application to the FISC, which the court indicates that it will 
approve on condition that the government makes changes that narrow 
the request. Once the government makes these changes, the FISC 
approves the application. While some critics of the metadata program 
and other proceedings under FISA assert that the FISC’s high approval 
rate makes it a “rubber stamp,” this critique misses the “iterative 
process” that characterizes litigation in that court.47 
The first opinion to authorize bulk collection was a 2004 opinion by 
Judge Kollar-Kotelly that granted the government’s application under 
FISA to use a pen register to collect information on the routing or 
addressing of e-mails, excluding the content of communications.48 This 
opinion introduced a concept that would shape collection in the years to 
come: it coupled authority for the wide collection of information by the 
government with significant restrictions on the government’s use of that 
information. Judge Kollar-Kotelly assumed that a relevance standard 
governed both pen registers and FISC orders under section 215.49 
Finding that the statutory language in the FISA pen register provision 
did not require that the government identify specific targets prior to 
collection, Judge Kollar-Kotelly acknowledged that the statute allowed 
“exceptionally broad” acquisition of e-mail records,50 most of which 
would be “unrelated” to terrorism.51 To avoid giving the government the 
unchecked ability to rummage through these mountains of data, Judge 
Kollar-Kotelly added restrictions on government analysts’ access to the 
information collected. When structuring queries of the electronic data, 
Judge Kollar-Kotelly held that analysts could use only those e-mail 
addresses specifically linked to particular terrorist organizations.52 No 
other queries—for example, addresses of celebrities or government 
critics—were permissible. 
Supporting her analysis, Judge Kollar-Kotelly suggested that 
Congress intended the relevance standard in the pen register provision to 
broaden information gathering for national security purposes. The 
 
 47. See ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 48. [Case Name Redacted], No. PR/TT [redacted], at 13 (FISA Ct.), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf [hereinafter Kollar-Kotelly Opinion]; 
50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (2011) (authorizing pen register to acquire information “relevant to an ongoing 
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities”). While the 
date of the Kollar-Kotelly decision does not appear in the version released to the public, accounts 
uniformly set the date as July 2004. See Lizza, supra note 10, at 54 (giving the date as July 14, 2004); cf. 
Case Profile, The Civ. Rts. Litig. Clearinghouse, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13107 
(last visited Dec. 14, 2014).  
 49. Kollar-Kotelly Opinion, supra note 48, at 19. This view preceded the 2006 amendment of 
section 215 that formally introduced a relevance standard. 
 50. Id. at 21, 23. 
 51. Id. at 28. 
 52. Id. at 42 (citing standard of “reasonable articulable suspicion” of terrorist ties). 
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relevance standard replaced language that required only a “reasonable 
suspicion” that the communication facility subject to the pen register be 
used by an individual engaged in “international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities.”53 Collecting e-mail metadata from a range of 
Internet service providers (“ISPs”) would meet the relevance standard, 
the court found, accepting the government’s argument.54 Broad 
collection would allow the government to ferret out previously unknown 
e-mail addresses linked to terrorism, which “more precisely targeted 
forms of collection against known accounts” would exclude.55 The court 
defended its deference to the government’s rationale, finding that, “for 
reasons of both constitutional authority and practical competence, 
deference should be given to the fully considered judgment of the 
executive branch in assessing and responding to national security threats 
and in determining the potential significance of intelligence-related 
information.”56 
In 2006, in a much shorter opinion, the FISC granted the 
government’s request under section 215 to authorize the bulk collection 
of metadata on virtually all land-line telephone calls originating in or 
received in the United States.57 Like Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s opinion, this 
opinion conditioned wide collection authority for the government on 
observance of substantial restrictions on access to the data collected.58 
The court allowed the government to acquire this huge database of 
phone numbers (again, not content), but sharply limited analysts’ access 
to the metadata. Rather than run any search the analysts could think up, 
the FISC limited the NSA to search queries containing specific phone 
numbers, or “identifiers.”59 For each identifier, a senior NSA official had 
to have a “reasonable and articulable suspicion” (“RAS”) of connections 
to a listed terrorist group.60 The FISC approves the terrorist groups that 
appear on the list61 and receive reports every thirty days on search 
 
 53. Id. at 29 n.21 (citing Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 601(2)). 
 54. Id. at 48–49. 
 55. Id. at 42 (adding that the “NSA needs bulk collection in order to identify unknown . . . 
communications” linked to terrorist groups). 
 56. Id. at 30 (citing Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988)). 
 57. See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from 
[Name Redacted by Court], No. BR 06-05, 2006 WL 7137486, at *1 (FISA Ct. May 24, 2006). 
 58. Id. at *11. 
 59. David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, Lawfare Res. Paper Series, Sept. 
29, 2013, at 10, available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Lawfare-
Research-Paper-Series-No.-4-2.pdf; Steven G. Bradbury, Understanding the NSA Programs: Bulk 
Acquisition of Telephone Metadata Under Section 215 and Foreign-Targeted Collection Under 
Section 702, Lawfare Res. Paper Series, Sept. 1, 2013, at 2–3, available at 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Bradbury-Vol-1-No-3.pdf. 
 60. Kris, supra note 59, at 10–11. 
 61. Id. 
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results.62 Pursuant to the FISC’s 2006 order, analysts querying the 
database with RAS-approved identifiers could search up to three “hops” 
from the identifier, for example, persons called by someone using an 
RAS-approved identifier, persons called by the recipient of that call, and 
the persons called by that second group of recipients.63 In January of 
2014, after the Snowden disclosures, President Obama asked the FISC to 
approve in advance all identifiers used by NSA analysts. The President 
also limited the NSA to data it could acquire through only two hops, not 
the previous three.64 
Legislation passed by the House of Representatives in May 2014 
and pending in the Senate as of July 2014 went further. The House bill 
limited government collection, leaving metadata in the hands of private 
companies. It also required the government to seek court orders from the 
FISC requiring telecommunications companies to produce records based 
on a “specific selection term” related to a foreign power or agent of a 
foreign power and other records up to two hops removed from this term. 
The House defined “specific selection term” as “a discrete term, such as 
a term specifically identifying a person, entity, account, address, or 
device, used by the Government to limit the scope of the information or 
tangible things sought.”65 
2. The Uses of Metadata 
The utility of the metadata program has been the subject of vigorous 
debate, with the government initially insisting that the program was 
“essential” and critics suggesting that the government’s claims were 
inflated.66 The fog of rhetoric on both sides obscures common ground. 
The program cannot claim exclusive credit for stopping a terrorist plot,67 
and in most investigations other alternatives could have provided (or 
actually did provide) information that identified the plotters. However, 
the most careful and comprehensive critics concede that the program has 
provided early information in investigations, allowed law enforcement to 
rule out suspects, and hedged against the persistent problem of disparate 
agencies failing to “connect the dots.”68 
 
 62. Id. at 11. In 2012, there were fewer than 300 RAS-approved identifiers. Id. at 12. 
 63. Id. at 12.  
 64. See Obama, supra note 1. 
 65. H.R. 3361 113th Cong. § 107(k)(2) (as reported by the Committee on Judiciary and the 
Committee on Intelligence May 15, 2014), amending 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (emphasis added); see USA 
FREEDOM Act of 2014, S. 2685, 113th Cong. (introduced July 30, 2014) (narrowing definition of 
selection term). 
 66. See Ellen Nakashima, Skepticism Deepens About NSA Program, Wash. Post, Aug. 1, 2013, at A1. 
 67. See President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Commc’ns Techs., supra note 30, at 104 
(asserting without analysis that program is “not essential to preventing attacks”). 
 68.  ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that the program allows 
government to perform “the algorithmic data analysis to find ‘connections between known and 
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The single court to squarely address this question has agreed that 
the program is helpful because it allows the government to effectively, 
reliably, and expeditiously trace connections between known and 
unknown terrorists.69 Having a large database enhances the 
comprehensiveness of the government’s search for connections. As the 
district court noted in ACLU v. Clapper, “without all the data points, the 
Government cannot be certain it connected the pertinent ones.”70 
Having a single large database avoids the waste of time entailed in 
chasing down leads with different telecommunications providers.71 
Promulgating a single set of rules for that database ensures that data will 
be deleted only when the government, taking both security and privacy 
into account, is confident that the data is irrelevant. 
For an illustration of the benefits and limits of the metadata 
program, consider the case of Najibullah Zazi, who had plotted in 2009 to 
bomb New York City subways.72 Pursuant to the metadata program, the 
NSA provided the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) with 
information “early in the investigation” showing Zazi’s telephone calls.73 
The NSA also provided the FBI with “additional leads” throughout the 
investigation.74 Moreover, the NSA used section 215 to ascertain the 
unknown telephone number of one of Zazi’s New York accomplices, 
Adis Medunjanin.75 While this information may well have been available 
from other sources,76 the metadata program is what provided the facts. 
The metadata program also plays an important role in allocating 
government counterterrorism resources. For example, as Ryan 
Goodman suggests, the comprehensive nature of the section 215 program 
 
unknown international terrorist operatives’”). The court undertook this analysis despite finding that 
section 215’s statutory scheme precluded individual suits for injunctive relief. Id. at 32–42. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. Clapper and another district court have come to opposite conclusions on whether the bulk 
collection of metadata constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. Compare id. at 749–52 
(holding that individual caller has no reasonable expectation of privacy in telecommunications 
companies’ call records), with Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 25–29, 41 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding 
that metadata program constitutes unreasonable search); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–43 
(1979) (articulating the “third-party doctrine,” which holds that individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in items such as call records that are voluntarily shared with a third party in the 
course of creating such records). But see Christopher Slobogin, Privacy at Risk 156–58 (2007) 
(critiquing third-party doctrine). I refer to this issue later in the piece. See infra note 262 and 
accompanying text (noting debate about whether government access to “mosaic” of metadata showing 
individuals’ habits and beliefs triggers expectation of privacy). However, definitive analysis of the 
Fourth Amendment issue is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 71. See PCLOB Section 702 Report, supra note 31, at 155 n.556 (conceding that 
telecommunications companies “likely vary” in their speed in responding to government requests). 
 72. Id. at 149–52. 
 73. Id. at 150. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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allows the government to rule out foreign connections to plots, such as 
the Boston Marathon bombing.77 While this capability may not be as eye-
catching as the ability to ferret out a pending plot, it can help law 
enforcement and national security officials allocate resources in the long 
and short term. In the long term, the metadata program gives officials a 
view from 20,000 feet on the links to international terrorist groups within 
the United States. If queries show a relatively small presence, officials 
can focus their efforts narrowly, and devote more resources to foreign 
threats. The metadata program reduces the guesswork involved in 
allocation decisions, and solidifies the factual foundation for these 
complex determinations. In the near term, the metadata program can 
inform allocation of resources in the chaotic period immediately 
following an attack. During the Boston Marathon bombing investigation, 
for example, section 215 collection helped to confirm early on that the 
Tsarnaev brothers acted without foreign assistance.78 That confirmation 
curbed counterproductive speculation, and focused resources on the 
Tsarnaev brothers’ roles.79 
The metadata program also provides for efficiency in tracing 
contacts. In some investigations, speed may turn out to be less important 
because law enforcement officials are gathering information and 
monitoring a subject over time. However, as Director of the FBI James 
Comey testified to Congress in January 2014, the “agility” produced by 
the metadata program may turn out to be quite useful in a fast-moving 
investigation. Comey put it simply: that agility, which permits law 
enforcement to accomplish “in minutes what would otherwise 
take . . . hours,” is “not material except when it matters most.”80 
Finally, the metadata program is a useful hedge if agencies fail to 
share information that could allow them to connect the dots in a 
counterterrorism investigation. This failure was the most salient problem 
with the actions of law enforcement and security officials prior to the 
September 11 attacks.81 Although the situation has improved,82 deficits in 
cooperation will inevitably occur whenever agencies seek to coexist.83 
 
 77. See Ryan Goodman, How to Evaluate Whether the NSA’s Telephony Metadata Program 
Makes Us Safer (and What Proponents and Opponents Get Wrong), Just Security (Dec. 27, 2013, 
9:13 AM), http://justsecurity.org/2013/12/27/effectiveness-telephony-metadata-program/; cf. 
President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Commc’ns Techs., supra note 30, at 104 
(acknowledging that “negative results from section 215 queries have helped to alleviate concern that 
particular terrorist suspects are in contact with co-conspirators in the United States,” while asserting 
that the metadata program is too small to provide comprehensive information on this point).  
 78. Goodman, supra note 77. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Senate Select Intelligence Comm., Current and Projected National Security Threats Against 
the U.S., Fed. News Serv., Jan. 29, 2014. 
 81. PCLOB Section 702 Report, supra note 31, at 153–55. 
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B. Section 702 
Under section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 
(“FAA”),84 the government may conduct surveillance targeting the 
contents of communications of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to 
be located abroad when the surveillance will result in acquiring foreign 
intelligence information.85 Pursuant to the FAA, the government must 
file a certification with the FISC that details its targeting procedures, as 
well as minimization procedures that reduce the likelihood that analysts 
will use or retain purely domestic communications or irrelevant 
information about U.S. persons, defined as U.S. citizens and lawful 
permanent residents.86 The FISC can review these and other materials to 
determine whether the government has complied with the statute, 
although the FISC does not need to approve individual targets selected 
by the government.87 
Under section 702, foreign intelligence information that the 
government may acquire includes data related to national security, such 
as information concerning an “actual or potential attack” or “other grave 
hostile acts [by a] foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”88 
Foreign intelligence information also comprises information relating to 
possible sabotage89 and clandestine foreign “intelligence activities.”90 
Another prong of the definition is broader, encompassing information 
relating to the “the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.”91 
The absence of a requirement for FISC approval of individual 
targeting choices under section 702 is rooted in the constitutional status 
of foreign surveillance and the path to enactment of section 702. The 
Supreme Court held in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez that non-U.S. 
 
 82. See Matthew C. Waxman, Police and Nat’l Sec.: American Local Law Enforcement and 
Counterterrorism After 9/11, 3 J. Nat’l Sec. L. & Pol’y 377, 385 (2009). 
 83. See Michael P. Robotti, Grasping the Pendulum: Coordination Between Law Enforcement 
and Intelligence Officers Within the Dep’t of Justice in a Post-“Wall” Era, 64 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. 
L. 751, 809–19 (2009). 
 84. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2011). 
 85. Id. § 1881a(a). Portions of the discussion in this Subpart originated in an earlier piece. See 
Margulies, supra note 44, at 2140–41. 
 86. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(c)(1)(A)–(B); id. § 1801(i). 
 87. See President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Commc’ns Techs., supra note 30, at 
135. The Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence can issue a determination that 
permits surveillance without prior FISC approval when exigent circumstances so require. Exigent 
circumstances exist when, without immediate action, “intelligence important to the national security of 
the United States may be lost or not timely acquired.” 50 U.S.C. § 1881(c)(2). In this exigent situation, 
the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence must submit a certification to the FISC 
seeking authorization within seven days. Id. § 1881(g)(1)(B). 
 88. Id. § 1801(e)(1)(A). 
 89. Id. § 1801(e)(1)(B). 
 90. Id. § 1801(e)(1)(C). 
 91. Id. § 1801(e)(2)(B). 
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persons (defined as those other than U.S. citizens, lawful permanent 
residents, or located in the territorial United States) do not enjoy the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment.92 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing 
for the Court, explained that the Fourth Amendment uses the term “the 
people” to identify beneficiaries of the amendment’s “right . . . to be 
secure in . . . persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”93 The phrase “the people,” according to the Chief 
Justice, was a “term of art” that occurs elsewhere in the Constitution and 
in each case refers to the “people of the United States.”94 
Moreover, functional considerations weigh against subjecting 
foreign searches and seizures to the restrictions imposed by the Fourth 
Amendment, including the requirement of an individualized warrant. 
Subjects of surveillance abroad might be harbored by foreign states that 
are indifferent or even hostile to U.S. law enforcement, and U.S. courts 
might not have authority over foreign courts, making the issuance of a 
warrant a futile exercise. Consequently, the Supreme Court has generally 
interpreted rights against search and seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment to include only U.S. citizens, legal permanent residents, or 
those physically present in the United States.95 
Even with respect to searches and seizures abroad concerning U.S. 
citizens or lawful permanent residents, courts have held that there is a 
“foreign intelligence exception” to the warrant requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment. In United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, a case 
involving a Vietnamese national in the United States who had sought to 
convey sensitive U.S. diplomatic cables to Vietnamese negotiators, the 
Fourth Circuit located the rationale for such an exception in the need for 
“stealth, speed, and secrecy” in countering foreign threats, and in the 
executive’s expertise and constitutional responsibility in the area of 
foreign affairs.96 
In Keith, the Supreme Court, while not completely resolving this 
issue, invited Congress to legislate on the requirements for national 
security searches.97 In response to this invitation and executive abuses 
involving warrantless surveillance of U.S. citizens within the United 
States that the Court had addressed in Keith, Congress enacted FISA, 
which imposed requirements on the executive for conducting 
 
 92. 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990). 
 93. Id.; U.S. Const. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
 94. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265. 
 95. Id. at 274–75. 
 96. 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980); see In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (discussing foreign intelligence exception 
for warrant requirement); United States v. Duka, 671 F.3d 329, 341 (3rd Cir. 2011) (same); United States v. 
Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, 2014 WL 2866749, at *18 (D. Ore. June 24, 2014) (same). 
 97. Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972). 
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surveillance in the United States on an agent of a foreign power. Those 
requirements included an individualized warrant. 
The George W. Bush administration, in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks, decided, based on a questionable legal opinion from the Justice 
Department, that it could disregard FISA.98 It unilaterally initiated a 
sweeping surveillance initiative known as the Terrorist Surveillance 
Program (“TSP”), based on the President’s Article II authority, or on 
implied authority derived from the Authorization for the Use of Military 
Force that Congress had enacted for the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan 
after September 11.99 After the TSP came to light in late 2005, the 
administration sought and received authorization from the FISC for 
portions of the program.100 Shifts in the FISC’s position on the legality of 
the program led to passage of the Protect America Act (“PAA”).101 
Congress worried, however, that the PAA did not provide sufficient 
protections for U.S. persons. In 2008, Congress, including then-Senator 
Barack Obama, enacted the FAA on a bipartisan vote.102 
According to the President’s Review Group, which President 
Barack Obama commissioned to study surveillance after the Snowden 
disclosures, section 702 has played a concrete role in keeping the nation 
safe.103 The Review Group’s report asserted that section 702 was 
“critical” to the uncovering of the Zazi planned subway attack in New 
York in 2009, and led to the arrest of Zazi and his accomplices.104 The 
section 702 program resulted in obtaining information that “contributed 
in some degree” to a successful outcome regarding thwarted terrorist 
attacks in the United States and other countries in fifty-three out of fifty-
four instances.105 According to the Review Group, section 702 “does in 
fact play an important role in the nation’s effort to prevent terrorist 
attacks across the globe.”106 The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board (“PCLOB”) agreed with this assessment, concluding that 
collection under section 702 “significantly aids the government’s efforts 
 
 98. See Office of the Inspector Gen. of the Dep’t of Def. et al., Unclassified Report on the 
President’s Surveillance Program 10–13 (2009), available at http://fas.org/irp/eprint/psp.pdf.  
 99. Dep’t of Justice, The NSA Program to Detect and Prevent Terrorist Attacks: Myth v. 
Reality 1 (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2006/02/02/ 
nsa_myth_v_reality.pdf.  
 100. Letter from Alberto Gonzales, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., to Senators Patrick Leahy & Arlen 
Specter (Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/politics/20060117 
gonzales_Letter.pdf; cf. Clark, supra note 231, at 403 (discussing chronology of events). 
 101.  Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (2007) (codified as amended in 
various sections of 50 U.S.C.) 
 102. 154 Cong. Rec. S6470 (daily ed. July 9, 2008). 
 103. See President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Commc’ns Techs., supra note 30, at 143.  
 104. Id. at 143–44.  
 105. Id. at 144–45.  
 106. Id. at 145.  
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to prevent terrorism . . . combat weapons proliferation and gather foreign 
intelligence.”107 
II.  Relevance Under Section 215: Statutory  
Ambiguity and CHEVRON 
Because the FISC’s approval of the metadata program has its roots 
in Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s 2004 Internet pen register opinion, it is useful 
to analyze the statutory issue of relevance under section 215 as Judge 
Kollar-Kotelly did under the pen register statute: as a matter of 
deference to executive interpretation. Judge Kollar-Kotelly deferred to 
the executive branch, just as the Supreme Court has done in many other 
cases pertaining to national security, such as Department of Navy v. 
Egan.108 In a statutory context, two steps sum up the government’s claim 
that deference is owed. First, a court asks whether the statute is 
ambiguous.109 If that court finds that the statute is ambiguous, the court 
moves on to step two, and asks whether the government’s interpretation 
is reasonable.110 This Part addresses the first step. 
A. Defining Relevance Down: A Tale of Three Dictionaries 
Two definitional questions flow from the phrase “relevant to an 
authorized investigation”111 in the pre-Snowden version of section 215.112 
The first is the meaning of relevance. The second is the meaning of “an 
authorized investigation.” Critics of the metadata program do not regard 
this language as ambiguous. Instead, they assert that relevance under 
section 215 is clear, requiring a substantive link to investigation of a 
particular crime.113 In contrast, the FISC and at least one federal district 
 
 107. See PCLOB Section 702 Report, supra note 31, at 93. 
 108. 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988). For the central Supreme Court case on deference to administrative 
agencies, see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984); cf. Curtis A. 
Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 Va. L. Rev. 649, 668–75 (2000) (discussing 
virtues of appropriately cabined doctrine of deference in foreign affairs); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 Yale L.J. 1170 (2007) (arguing for deference to 
the executive); Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 Yale 
L.J. 1230, 1257–75 (2007) (arguing against blanket deference to the executive); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, 
Admin. Law Goes to War, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2663, 2669–70 (2005) (arguing that deference to 
presidential interpretations can be problematic when deference conflicts with civil liberties); Joseph 
Landau, Chevron Meets Youngstown: Nat’l Sec. and the Admin. State, 92 B.U.L. Rev. 1917, 1924–25 
(2012) (discussing Chevron deference and the separation of powers in national security cases). 
 109. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 110. Id. at 843. 
 111. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2006). 
 112. I use the phrase “pre-Snowden” to refer to the version of section 215 that was in effect at the 
time of Snowden’s revelations. That version was still in effect as of July, 2014, although the House bill 
passed in May 2014 heralded substantial changes that will emerge in final form when the Senate takes 
up the bill later in 2014. 
 113. See Donohue, supra note 8 (manuscript at 58).  
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court have viewed the statutory language more broadly,114 suggesting 
that relevance can entail a relationship to the function of the 
investigating agency. Moreover, an investigation need not focus on a 
particular crime; it can instead be a wide-ranging inquiry into a category 
of wrongdoing, such as international terrorism.115 
Dictionaries do not resolve the debate. According to the Supreme 
Court, “Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of 
the . . . terms it uses.”116 With relevance, however, well-settled meanings 
seem built on semantic sand. Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines the 
term “relevant” as “having significant and demonstrable bearing on the 
matter at hand.”117 Secondary definitions include the following: 
“affording evidence tending to prove or disprove the matter at issue or 
under discussion” or being “proportional” or “relative” to a particular 
item.118 The Oxford English Dictionary is even less illuminating; it 
defines “relevant” as “legally pertinent or sufficient,” adding as a 
secondary meaning, “[b]earing on, connected with, or pertinent to the 
matter at hand.”119 Black’s Law Dictionary is hardly more enlightening. 
It defines “relevant” as “[a]pplying to the matter in question; affording 
something to the purpose.”120 What that special “something” is, however, 
remains unclear. In sum, the dictionary definitions of relevance only 
heighten the ambiguity of the statute’s text. 
B. Metadata’s Critics on Case Law and Legislative History 
Critics have made headway when they turn to case law.121 Even 
though the decisions regularly extol the relevance standard’s 
flexibility,122 case law typically deals with investigations of wrongdoing by 
a specific individual, group, or entity. For example, in United States v. 
Arthur Young & Co., the Supreme Court upheld a request by the 
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) for documents and other information 
related to the accuracy of a corporation’s tax return.123 In construing the 
definition of relevance under a provision of the Internal Revenue Code 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Kris, supra note 59, at 18–20. 
 116. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 23 (1999). 
 117. See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1051 (11th ed. 2003).  
 118. Id. 
 119. The Oxford English Dictionary 561 (2d ed. 1989).  
 120. Black’s Law Dictionary 1455 (4th ed. 1968). 
 121. For an excellent survey, see PCLOB Section 702 Report, supra note 31, at 63–78 (arguing 
that government’s definition does not fit context of cases). 
 122. See First Fin. Bank, N.A. v. Bauknecht, No. 12-CV-1509, 2013 WL 3833039, at * 1 (C.D. Ill. July 
23, 2013) (noting that “the discovery relevance standard is flexible”); In re H&R Block Mortg. Corp., No. 
2:06-MD-230 (MDL 1767), 2007 WL 325351, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 30, 2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note that in discovery, “a flexible treatment of relevance is required.”). 
 123. 465 U.S. 805, 814 (1984). 
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governing IRS inquiries, the Court stressed the importance of flexibility, 
even requiring production of documents that the corporation had not 
used to prepare its return if those documents could provide information 
on the corporation’s overall tendency to take aggressive positions on 
taxes owed.124 Courts reviewing grand jury subpoenas will sometimes 
assess relevance with respect to entire categories of documents, which 
may include vast numbers of individual items.125 Nevertheless, as a 
balanced assessment of section 215 acknowledges, the investigations at 
issue in the cases were relatively discrete, compared to the 
comprehensiveness of bulk collection in the metadata program.126 Based 
on the case law, critics can plausibly argue that relevance under section 
215 should concern specific investigations, not the collection of a 
substantial percentage of U.S. call records. 
The legislative history of section 215’s amendment in 2006 also 
provides some support for the critics’ view, although a significant strand 
in that history bolsters a broader conception. Supporters of a narrow 
view, which ties relevance to discrete investigations, can point to 
statements from Republican Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona, who described 
relevance as:  
“a term that every court uses . . . in every other situation in the 
country . . . the standard employed for the issuance of discovery orders 
in civil litigation, grand jury subpoenas in a criminal investigation, and 
for each and every one of the 335 different administrative subpoenas 
currently authorized by the United States Code.”127  
Senator Orrin Hatch also seemed to accept such limits, reminding his 
colleagues that “no section 215 order can be issued for material that 
would be beyond the scope of a grand jury subpoena.”128 
C. A Contrasting View: Relevance and the Government’s Role 
While the narrow account of relevance finds some support in the 
case law and legislative history, an alternative reading is also possible. 
This reading anchors relevance in the relationship between the 
information requested and the requester’s role. A requesting entity’s role 
 
 124. Id. at 814–15. 
 125. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d 1186, 1202 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 126. See Kris, supra note 59, at 23 n.84. 
 127. See 152 Cong. Rec. S1395 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kyl). While on its face 
this statement suggests that Congress regarded bulk collection as a piece of more targeted information 
gathering, Kyl nowhere mentions metadata expressly. Kyl does mention what we know now as the 
section 702 program, which he describes as “surveillance . . . involving international communications 
with members of al-Qaida or people suspected of being with al-Qaida.” Id. He notes the secret nature 
of this program, which he observes was the subject of a government briefing for “select members of 
the [Senate] Intelligence Committee.” Id. 
 128. 51 Cong. Rec. S13,643 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
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may include fiduciary responsibilities, in which the entity functions as a 
repository for the trust of its members or constituents.129 
To comply with its fiduciary obligations, the fiduciary requires 
information about threats and opportunities. The need for information is 
even more compelling when both threats and opportunities shift rapidly. 
The ability to adjust to that dynamic environment is a hallmark of a 
fiduciary’s success. In managing that adjustment, a fiduciary may also be 
bound by limits on her authority in custom, law, or contract.130 
A sovereign state like the United States has broad fiduciary 
obligations. Alexander Hamilton, writing in The Federalist No. 23, spoke 
the language of fiduciary relationships when he asserted that the 
“government ought to be clothed with all the powers requisite to 
complete execution of its trust.”131 Hamilton alluded repeatedly to this 
characterization, urging that the federal government receive “the most 
ample authority for fulfilling the objects committed to its charge,”132 
acknowledging “the responsibility [of the federal government] implied in 
the duty assigned to it,”133 and describing the federal government as 
“that body to which the guardianship of the public safety is confided.”134 
Commenting on the dynamic nature of threats and the corresponding 
adjustments demanded of officials discharging their responsibilities, 
Hamilton observed that, “it is impossible to foresee or to define the 
extent and variety of national exigencies, and the corresponding extent 
and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them.”135 Yet 
the Framers also recognized that the government official as fiduciary 
faced temptations to parade out national security threats as a pretext for 
restraints on freedom. To guard against this danger, James Madison 
advised, “[a] wise nation” will not “rashly preclude itself from any 
resource . . . essential to its safety,” but will also minimize “both the 
necessity and the danger of resorting to [any means] . . . which may be 
inauspicious to its liberties.”136 
Decisions on the scope of subpoenas or other requests for 
information often use language addressed not only to the substantive 
connection between the information sought and a particular substantive 
investigation, but also to the underlying function of the investigative 
agency or entity. In an early case on the authority of regulatory agencies, 
the Supreme Court held that the Interstate Commerce Commission had 
 
 129. See Leib, et al., supra note 21, at 705–06. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See The Federalist No. 23, supra note 12, at 153–54 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 132. Id. at 155. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 153 (emphasis omitted). 
 136. See The Federalist No. 41, supra note 12, at 257–58 (James Madison). 
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wide authority to investigate efforts to suppress competition by railroads, 
even without specific allegations of wrongdoing.137 That wide authority, 
the Court explained, was essential to the “vigilant function” of the 
agency.138 Explaining further, the Court maintained that the 
Commission’s ambit of investigative authority “must be as 
comprehensive as the interest of the whole country . . . [i]f the problems 
which are presented to it . . . are complex and difficult,” such that the 
definition of relevance required sufficient flexibility to meet the 
challenge.139 In Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, the Court 
noted that the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor had 
an “investigative function” necessary to “securing enforcement” of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act.140 Harmonizing the needs of the agency and 
the interests of the parties from whom information is sought “cannot be 
reduced to formula,” the Court cautioned, since “relevancy and 
adequacy or excess in the breadth of the subpoena are matters variable 
in relation to the nature, purposes, and scope of the inquiry.”141 
Modern cases echo this theme. While Arthur Young supports the 
critics’ insistence on the need for a discrete investigation, it also supplies 
grist for the government’s mill.142 In Arthur Young, the Court upheld a 
broad subpoena of tax-related documents by the IRS, asserting that 
requests for documents were a “tool of discovery . . . critical to the 
investigative and enforcement functions of the IRS.”143 Another long 
chain of precedent stresses that the broad ability to request information 
permits labor unions to protect the interests of their members. In NLRB 
v. Acme Industries. Co., the Court held that to investigate concerns that 
an employer was outsourcing labor in violation of a collective bargaining 
agreement, a union had to show merely that the “desired 
information . . . would be of use to the union in carrying out its statutory 
duties and responsibilities.”144 
The legislative history of section 215’s enactment also supports this 
conception of relevance as evolving with the government’s fiduciary 
responsibilities. For example, Senator Kyl warned that a narrow standard 
would make it “unnecessarily difficult for our intelligence agents and our 
law enforcement officers to do the job we have asked them to do.”145 Kyl 
 
 137. Smith v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 245 U.S. 33, 43 (1917). 
 138. Id. at 44. 
 139. Id. at 45. 
 140. 327 U.S. 186, 216 (1946). 
 141. Id. at 209. 
 142. 465 U.S. 805 (1984). 
 143. Id. at 814. 
 144. 385 U.S. 432, 437 (1967). 
 145. 152 Cong. Rec. S1396 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kyl). Senator Sessions 
echoed this theme, asserting that amendments requiring that the government show “specific and 
articulable facts” demonstrating relevance to terrorism were “unworkable and burdensome. . . [and] 
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emphasized that threats were dynamic, and the government’s capabilities 
had to evolve, as well. As Kyl put it, terrorist groups are “sophisticated 
and devote enormous time and energy to understanding how we operate, 
all in service of allowing their agents to evade our investigations.”146 
Responding to the threat requires “speed and . . . agility.”147 Particularly 
in the case of international terrorism, investigations are likely to be both 
broad and far ranging.148 
Moreover, although the legislative debates on section 215 do not 
include discussion of intelligence gathering that mirrors the metadata 
program’s size and scope, legislators acknowledged that the statute could 
authorize bulk collection. For example, Senator Carl Levin of Michigan 
warned that the Conference Report’s language, which eventually became 
law, authorized information gathering of extraordinary breadth. 
Illustrating his concerns, Senator Levin cautioned that the FBI could 
look for one suspected terrorist by reviewing “all the computer user 
records held by public libraries in New York.”149 Moreover, Senator 
Levin predicted that the bill would allow the government to obtain the 
records of an HIV clinic, including “10,000 patient files.”150 Yet Senator 
Levin eventually voted for the bill with no changes to statutory language, 
as did a number of progressive Democratic senators, including then-
Senator Obama.151 The Senate Intelligence Committee Report may 
supply a clue to the progressives’ shift: confidence that the FISC would 
require a “sufficient explanation” of relevance from the government152 
and “direct modification of the requested order”153 to reflect the 
fiduciary balance between security and liberty.  
D. Sunset Clauses and the Dynamic Conception 
Another indicator that a broad relevance standard is a plausible 
construction of Congress’s intent is the use of a sunset clause. Sunset 
clauses mandate that legislation expire at a date certain unless Congress 
renews the law. Congress viewed the inclusion of a sunset clause for 
section 215 as a means to gain experience on implementation of the 
 
would undermine the ability for the investigators to do what we intended to authorize them to do.” Id. 
at S1400 (statement of Sen. Sessions). 
 146. 152 Cong. Rec. S2437 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 147. 152 Cong. Rec. S1395 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kyl).  
 148. Kris, supra note 59, at 19. 
 149. 152 Cong. Rec. S2436 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 2006) (statement of Sen. Levin).  
 150. Id. 
 151. 152 Cong. Rec. S1401 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 2006) (statement of Sen. Obama) (supporting the 
Conference Report language that ultimately became law). 
 152. See U.S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, Report to Accompany S. 1266, S. Rep. No. 109-85, 
at 7 (2005). 
 153. Id. 
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law.154 Keeping statutory authority on a relatively short temporal leash 
while allowing flexibility in implementation is a rational approach, 
particularly in an environment characterized by adaptive threats and 
rapidly changing technology.155 
The legislative history of the USA Patriot Act confirms this 
characterization of sunset clauses as permitting greater flexibility. 
Legislators regarded the sunset clause in the Patriot Act as functionally 
equivalent to substantive constraints on government power. Illustrating 
this equivalence, legislators and the Bush administration treated 
inclusion of a sunset clause as a bargaining chip. Legislators got a sunset 
clause, which the Bush administration opposed, and, in return, legislators 
had to eliminate other constraints, such as limits on sharing grand jury 
information with other agencies, reporting provisions on government 
receipt of data from stored communications, and establishment of a new 
Inspector General position focusing on civil liberties.156 
To facilitate information sharing by the executive on the law’s 
implementation, Congress enacted reporting requirements. According to 
these requirements, the Attorney General must submit a range of 
information to the intelligence and judiciary committees of the House 
and Senate every six months.157 That information must include a 
“summary of significant legal interpretations” advanced by the 
government in FISC proceedings158 and the opinions of the FISC and its 
statutorily designated appellate court, the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court of Review.159 By 2007, less than a year after the FISC 
authorized the bulk collection of telephony metadata, even Senator Ron 
Wyden of Oregon, the leading legislative opponent of the program, 
acknowledged that he received adequate information about the 
program’s size, scope, and design.160 Senator Wyden recalled that the 
government’s disclosures triggered major substantive concerns on his 
part.161 Wyden said he was shocked at what he termed “the gap between 
what people think the law is and how it’s been secretly interpreted.”162 
 
 154. 152 Cong. Rec. S1402 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 2006) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (expressing 
concern that the approved language on relevance in section 215 could promote “fishing 
expeditions . . . if not carefully monitored” and praising the sunset provisions as “important element of 
the continued vigorous oversight necessary” to keep statute within bounds). 
 155. For a different view that urges caution in addressing new technologies of surveillance without 
clear statutory authorization, see Orin S. Kerr, A Rule of Lenity for National Security Surveillance 
Law, 101 Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2434326. 
 156. See Emily Berman, The Paradox of Counterterrorism Sunset Provisions, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 
1777, 1789 (2013). 
 157. See 50 U.S.C. § 1871 (2014). 
 158. Id. § 1871(a)(4). 
 159. Id. § 1871(a)(5). 
 160. See Lizza, supra note 10, at 55. 
 161. Id. “Holy Toledo!” was Wyden’s first response. Id. 
 162. Id. 
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Wyden’s consistent opposition to the legislation’s enactment, based 
on the authority it granted to the government, suggests that he viewed 
the scope of the metadata program as predictable, rather than 
surprising.163 The key point, however, is that because of the 
government’s disclosures to Congress, Wyden had the ability to urge 
either amendment or outright repeal when the statute expired pursuant 
to the sunset clause. That built-in temporal constraint on the statute’s 
operation is entirely consistent with a dynamic conception, which 
acknowledges that Congress might eventually come to view the statute as 
ineffective, injurious, or obsolete, and legislate accordingly.164 
III.  The Reasonableness of the Dynamic Conception of 
Surveillance Under Section 215 
Having established that the statute is at least ambiguous, this Article 
now addresses the second step of the deference analysis: the 
reasonableness of the executive branch’s position. The dynamic 
conception, as exemplified in the metadata program, raises difficult 
questions about the relationship between government secrecy and two 
core values in national security surveillance: deliberation and strategic 
advantage. Until Snowden’s revelations, secrecy was central to the 
metadata program. Critics of the program, like Senator Wyden, regard 
secrecy as a prime enabler of what they perceive as the program’s 
overreaching. However, a healthy wariness about secrecy and its ill 
effects should not obscure secrecy’s benefits. This Part suggests that 
secrecy as understood by the Framers, secret dialogue between the 
branches of government, and case law addressing surveillance have 
benefits as well as costs. The same can be said for public disclosure. The 
dynamic conception is a reasonable alternative because it captures 
secrecy’s benefits while leveraging participation of all three branches to 
reduce the cost of secrecy. 
 
 163. Wyden had voted against the section 215 amendments in 2006, while others like Senators 
Levin, Biden, and Obama who had opposed the amendments initially because of concerns about the 
breadth of the government’s authority, eventually voted for the legislation. Id. at 54. 
 164. To focus on the larger questions of statutory interpretation, this Article will not analyze in 
depth whether the broad reading of relevance under section 215 clashes with other statutes, such as 
FISA’s pen register provision, 50 U.S.C. § 1842 (2010). In the [Case name redacted] case, Judge Kollar-
Kotelly opined that the FISA pen register provision is not more restrictive than section 215. Kollar-
Kotelly Opinion, supra note 48, at 19–23. In passing the USA Patriot Act in 2001, Congress removed 
language that limited relevance in the pen register statute to information concerning individuals 
involved with international terrorism, foreign powers, or their agents. See USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. 
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 286, § 214(a) (2001), deleting subsection included in Intelligence Authorization 
Act for FY99, Pub. L. No. 105-272, 112 Stat. 2396, § 402(c)(3) (1998). This suggests that the two 
statutes were moving in tandem. But see PCLOB Section 215 Report, supra note 29, at 86–87 
(arguing that statutes clash). 
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A. Deliberation and Secrecy 
For a fiduciary seeking to gather information in a fluid threat 
environment, deliberation is vital. Deliberation entails, as Hannah 
Arendt suggested, the ability to look at issues from all possible angles.165 
That capacity will suggest previously unconsidered options, and may take 
other options off the table. In a constitutional republic, deliberation must 
serve a double purpose: as Hamilton explained, it must allow 
decisionmakers, to the extent possible, to foresee “national exigencies, 
and the corresponding extent and variety of the means which may be 
necessary” to address them.166 In doing so, however, deliberation must 
also attend to Madison’s warning that concerns about security can skew 
decisionmakers’ judgment, enhancing the appeal of means that may be 
“inauspicious to . . . liberties.”167 President Obama captured the fine 
balance required, noting that “there is an inevitable bias . . . within the 
intelligence community . . . [and] among all of us who are responsible for 
national security, to collect more information about the world, not 
less.”168 
In deliberating about the scope of national security surveillance, 
secrecy is a double-edged sword. As the European Court of Human 
Rights acknowledged some time ago, some level of secrecy is necessary 
for surveillance programs.169 A program that requires too much detail 
about the bases for surveillance will allow terrorists to adapt their 
behavior, operating just below the threshold that triggers government 
scrutiny.170 Since detailed public disclosure would materially impair 
surveillance’s operational effectiveness, it would also limit the choices 
available to decisionmakers. Limiting options eviscerates the opportunity 
for deliberation itself, removing choices that are otherwise sound, and 
forcing decisionmakers to select choices that are inferior.171 
However, secrecy can also enable hasty unilateral action. Consider 
the blowback occasioned by the disastrous CIA-sponsored Bay of Pigs 
episode. That ill-fated invasion of Cuba by anti-Castro émigrés would 
not have come to pass if policymakers had been obliged to publicly 
disclose their plans in advance.172 While hindsight is always 20/20, it 
 
 165. See Arendt, supra note 12, at 242. 
 166. See The Federalist No. 23, supra note 12, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis omitted). 
 167. See The Federalist No. 41, supra note 12, at 257–58 (James Madison).  
 168. See Obama, supra note 1. 
 169. See Weber v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1173. 
 170. See Kennedy v. United Kingdom, App. No. 26839/05, ¶ 108, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010). 
 171. Cf. Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation 175 (Vintage Books 
1989) (1983) (noting argument that, “[i]f administrators had to do everything in the open, they might be 
forced to express only safe and uncontroversial views, and thus to bypass creative or still tentative ideas”). 
 172. Cf. Stephen M. Griffin, Long Wars and the Constitution 113 (2013) (blaming the Bay of Pigs 
debacle on flawed structure of national security decisionmaking, while asserting that U.S. public opinion 
would have supported even more aggressive posture toward Cuba); Michael J. Glennon, National 
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seems safe to argue that the United States would have been better off 
had those plans been disclosed. In such situations, requiring public 
disclosure would serve as a kind of pre-commitment device for 
winnowing out bad policy options. Moreover, in many national security 
contexts, including the warrantless surveillance of the Vietnam Era173 
and the “enhanced interrogation techniques” used by the United States 
in the eighteen months after September 11,174 secrecy can mask measures 
that violate rights under international and/or domestic law. 
The Framers sought to manage secrecy with the familiar 
architecture of separation of powers.175 Madison designed three branches 
with powers that overlapped, deterring unilateral action by any 
branch.176 The difficulty of acting unilaterally would logically reduce 
interbranch secrecy, since the effort to persuade another branch would 
usually involve disclosure of information. The necessity of persuading 
another branch would also have a useful ex ante effect on intrabranch 
decisionmaking. Hamilton, opining on the virtues of judicial review, 
extolled its ability to save the political branches from the perils of 
precipitous action.177 Judicial review, for Hamilton, would enhance 
deliberation, since the political branches would be obliged to factor in 
the effects of judicial scruples on political initiatives.178 
Over 150 years after the Constitution’s enactment, Justice Jackson 
described the Constitution’s architecture of deliberation between the 
branches.179 In his concurrence, Jackson tied the deference due the 
President to the degree of interbranch deliberation that the President has 
invited and received. A court, according to Jackson, should accord the 
President maximum deference when she acts consistently with 
Congress’s will, some deference when the executive acts against the 
 
Security and Double Government, 5 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. 1, 49–50 (2014) (asserting that several justices of 
the Supreme Court have backgrounds touching on national security that incline them to extend undue 
deference to unilateral executive action on foreign affairs and national security). 
 173. See President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Commc’ns Techs., supra note 30, at 54–55. 
 174. See Peter Margulies, Law’s Detour: Justice Displaced in the Bush Administration 59–66 
(2010); David Luban, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity 162, 176–80, 200–02 (2007); Kathleen Clark, 
Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. Nat’l Sec. L. & Pol’y 455 (2005); cf. 
Michael L. Kramer & Michael N. Schmitt, Lawyers on Horseback? Thoughts on Judge Advocates and 
Civil-Military Relations, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1407 (2008) (noting military lawyers’ opposition to such 
policies). 
 175. See Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism 9 (1st ed. 1993) (discussing the 
Framers’ debt to the English concept of three orders of government, that is, monarch, lords, and commons). 
 176. See The Federalist No. 51, supra note 12, at 322 (James Madison).  
 177. See The Federalist No. 78, supra note 12, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton).  
 178. Id. at 470. 
 179. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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backdrop of legislative silence,180 and minimal deference for decisions 
that defy congressional will.181 
Both section 215 and section 702 fit squarely into Jackson’s first 
category. In each case, Congress provided for some measure of review by 
the FISC accompanied by legislative oversight. That interbranch 
conversation produced the metadata program, including the definition of 
relevance offered by the FISC, and programs under section 702. 
As one would expect from a reasoned interbranch conversation, 
each program was tailored, particularly in the area of restrictions 
imposed by both the FISC and the NSA on analysts’ access to and use of 
data collected. For “about” collection under the Upstream program,182 
the FISC required the use of strong selectors keyed to producing foreign 
intelligence information. Under section 215, the FISC required that 
analysts use identifiers tied to terrorism to query the metadata collected. 
Critics assailed the scope of collection approved by the FISC under 
section 215 and, to a lesser extent, section 702.183 However, they failed to 
adequately address the importance of the use restrictions that the FISC 
imposed. Similarly, critics condemned the programs’ secrecy, but failed 
to reckon with the benefits of secrecy recognized by the Framers and by 
subsequent case law and legislative-executive branch dialogue.184 
Understanding the benefits of secrecy is an essential part of the context 
for interpreting both section 702 and the pre-Snowden version of section 
215. 
B. Secrecy in American Law 
In national security and foreign affairs, secrecy’s benefits for 
deliberation and strategic advantage have been an overarching theme 
since the United States declared its independence. Indeed, the case law 
sometimes fails to recognize secrecy’s costs.185 This Subpart’s 
examination of secrecy’s role is, in part, a descriptive exercise not 
connoting endorsement of the case law, but painting a landscape that 
Congress could plausibly have considered in enacting section 215 and 
section 702. Because programs under these provisions approved by the 
 
 180. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. 
Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411, 415 (2012). 
 181. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—
Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 689 (2008) (analyzing 
Youngstown’s implications). 
 182. PCLOB Section 702 Report, supra note 31, at 36. 
 183. See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 6, at 821; Donohue, supra note 8 (manuscript at 58). 
 184. See, e.g., Sagar, supra note 14, at 16–30; United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9–12 (1953). 
 185. Cf. Adam M. Samaha, Gov’t Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial 
Intervention, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 909, 933–41 (2006) (discussing case law). 
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FISC build in greater constraints, they should a fortiori be seen as 
reasonable constructions of their authorizing statutes. 
1. Secrecy and the Framers 
Although the Framers did not view secrecy as the norm, they found 
it to be a useful exception.186 Secrecy could create a corrosive distrust 
between the people and their representatives, the Framers recognized. 
On the other hand, secrecy was essential for the performance of some 
important governmental functions.187 
George Washington recognized, during the war for independence 
from the United Kingdom, that, during armed conflicts, secrecy was a 
necessary ingredient of tactical success. General Washington 
acknowledged this in a letter to a subordinate ordering reconnaissance in 
preparation for a possible attack on British forces.188 After noting the 
“necessity of . . . procuring good . . . Intelligence,” Washington cautioned 
his subordinate to “keep the whole matter as secret as possible.”189 
Explaining the need for secrecy, Washington advised that, “[U]pon 
secrecy, success depends in most Enterprises of the kind, and for want of 
it, they are generally defeated, however well planned and promising.”190 
As the heady days of independence lapsed into the chaos of the 
Articles of Confederation era, Washington and other prominent 
individuals convened together in Philadelphia under cloak of secrecy to 
draft a federal constitution. While the Congress had authorized the 
constitutional convention, the delegates ordered the secretary for the 
convention to deliver all records of the proceedings to Washington, who 
had presided over the gathering.191 The delegates apparently worried 
that the unvarnished debates in Philadelphia might prejudice public 
sentiment against the Constitution’s enactment, or perhaps embarrass 
the delegates who toiled there.192 
The Constitution itself mandated greater transparency, requiring 
both the House and Senate to “keep a Journal of [their] Proceedings.”193 
 
 186. See Sagar, supra note 14, at 16–30. 
 187. Id.  
 188. Letter from George Washington to Colonel Elias Dayton (July 26, 1777), in 8 The Writings 
of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745–99, 478–79 (John C. 
Fitzpatrick ed., 1933). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 479. 
 191. Max Farrand, Introduction to 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at xi, xi (Max 
Farrand ed., 1st ed. 1911). 
 192.  Not for the last time, the value of secrecy may have been overstated: the papers of the 
Convention were not published until thirty years later, after President Monroe delegated the task to 
then Secretary of State John Quincy Adams. Id. at xii. 
 193. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 3; cf. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, supra note 10, at 293–94 (discussing text 
and background of Journal Clause). 
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However, that transparency was not absolute. The Journal Clause also 
permitted the House and Senate to, at their discretion, exempt from 
publication portions of the proceedings that “require Secrecy.”194 James 
Wilson of Pennsylvania argued, in a presaging of the fallout from the 
Snowden disclosures, that secrecy could erode strategic advantages, 
lending ammunition to those suspicious of the idea of a federal 
constitution.195 However, a majority of delegates disagreed, keeping both 
the express provision for congressional transparency and the 
exception.196 
Alexander Hamilton, writing as Publius, also recognized the 
importance of secrecy. Praising the presidency’s potential virtues, 
Hamilton listed decisiveness, “secrecy,” and “dispatch” as cardinal 
benefits derived from a single chief executive.197 John Dickinson, 
addressing delegates to the Constitutional Convention, presaged these 
sentiments, noting the importance of executive “[s]ecrecy, vigor, and 
despatch.”198 Dickinson also agreed with Hamilton’s wariness about a 
plural executive, asserting the importance of locating “responsibility” 
within one person who could then be judged by his display of these 
virtues.199 
Hamilton and Dickinson’s mating of secrecy and the virtues of a 
single chief executive gave rise to another mainstay of constitutionalism 
in practice: a tendency to accord some deference to the President’s 
positions, particularly in foreign affairs. According to Dickinson, the 
“responsibility” to the people lodged in the President required a measure 
of deference, since it would be illogical to make a single executive 
answerable to the people or to other institutions of government without 
giving the executive the tools to “discharge its functions.”200 This 
measure of deference need not translate into a sweeping view of the 
President’s power.201 As I have suggested in a previous Article, the 
President’s authority in a constitutional republic will often be provisional 
and interstitial, filling gaps based on a reasonable belief that such action 
 
 194. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. 
 195. 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 260 (Max Farrand ed., 1st ed. 1911) 
(asserting that allowing any exception to transparency “would furnish the adversaries of . . . reform 
with a pretext by which weak & suspicious minds may be easily misled”). 
 196. Id. 
 197. See The Federalist No. 70, supra note 12, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton).  
 198. 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, supra note 191, at 140. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign 
Affairs, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 545, 551–52 (2004) (rejecting the view that the Vesting Clause, U.S. Const. 
art. II, § 1, cl. 1, grants the president broad residual authority over foreign affairs). 
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preserves Congress’s ability to deliberate.202 Secrecy will often be a 
useful aid in that effort. 
2. Secrecy and the Courts 
This synergy between deliberation, strategic advantage, and 
deference to the executive also plays out in case law involving 
government secrecy. Consider Totten v. United States,203 in which the 
Supreme Court fashioned an early version of the state secrets doctrine204 
in the course of mandating dismissal of a lawsuit seeking payment for 
services allegedly rendered by a clandestine Union operative during the 
Civil War.205 The Supreme Court worried that in the absence of a state 
secrets doctrine, an unscrupulous plaintiff could hold up the government 
for additional money by threatening to divulge sensitive information.206 
In heading off this threat, the Court recognized that secrecy was 
necessary in both war and foreign relations, and that an expectation of 
secrecy would prompt reliance by policymakers.207 Writing for the Court, 
Justice Field asserted that litigation of disputes over the terms of secret 
missions would risk exposure of such sensitive dealings, “to the serious 
detriment of the public.”208 Detriment would flow not merely from 
disclosure of sources and methods, but from a narrowing of the choices 
available to government.209 As Justice Field explained, the risk of 
exposure attendant on litigation would effectively make clandestine 
operations “impossible.”210 Courts have found, for similar reasons, that a 
privilege protects communications that assist the President’s 
deliberations.211 
 
 202. See Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law: Presidential Stewardship, 
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Separation of Powers, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 105, 131–33 (2014); cf. 
Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-
Contra Affair 78–79 (1990) (as an example of this interstitial view, observing that President 
Washington, in announcing his Neutrality Proclamation declaring the United States neutral between 
France and Britain, “expressly conceded that Congress had the power to change neutrality policy by 
legislation”).  
 203. 92 U.S. 105 (1875). 
 204. See Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 1249, 1277 (2007). 
 205. Totten, 92 U.S. at 105–07. 
 206. Id. at 106. 
 207. Id. (noting that the doctrine would be relevant in any case concerning “secret employments of 
the government in time of war, or . . . matters affecting our foreign relations, where a disclosure of the 
service might compromise or embarrass our government in its public duties”). 
 208. Id. at 106–07. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 107. 
 211. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705–06, 708 (1974). No privilege is absolute; parties who 
use the cloak of privilege to commit fraud or other criminal acts will not have their contrivances shielded 
from disclosure. Cf. id. at 707 (arguing that the needs of courts in criminal proceedings outweighed 
arguments in favor of executive privilege). Deliberation that furthers criminal conspiracies does not serve 
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Federal personnel cases over a century after Totten reveal a similar 
respect for the manner in which secrecy protects both executive and 
legislative options. In Haig v. Agee, the Supreme Court upheld the State 
Department’s revocation of the passport of an ex-CIA agent who had 
previously traveled abroad to disclose the names of U.S. intelligence 
operatives.212 In upholding the President’s action, the Court noted that 
the action enforced the confidentiality agreement that Agee had agreed 
to in accepting a federal position. The President’s enforcement of the 
contractual confidentiality agreement served deliberation in two ways. 
Without power to take such action, a President would have been 
vulnerable to extortion from unscrupulous ex-employees. To avoid 
negotiating with every ex-employee, agencies might limit consultation 
with their own personnel, which undermines deliberation.213 
The President’s action in Agee also preserved Congress’s 
opportunity to deliberate. In 1982, Congress expanded enforcement of 
confidentiality agreements with a criminal statute that prohibited the 
knowing disclosure of a CIA agent’s identity.214 If the President had not 
thwarted Agee’s plan, the ex-agent’s disclosures would have injured U.S. 
intelligence operations before Congress had an opportunity to act. The 
President’s action thus preserved Congress’ ability to pass effective 
legislation. 
Deference to the President on the cost of disclosure also drove the 
Court’s decision in Department of the Navy v. Egan.215 In limiting 
judicial review of the government’s denial of a security clearance to a 
federal employee to an inquiry into whether the government followed 
fair procedures, the Court noted the “sensitive and inherently 
discretionary” nature of decisions to grant security clearances.216 Justice 
Blackmun’s opinion for the Court asserted that this power flowed, not 
from any “explicit congressional grant,” but instead from the 
 
the public. The contours of the privilege recognize that, apart from this exception, impeding an individual 
or entity’s resort to deliberation with counsel would disserve the public interest. Id. at 709–10. 
 212. 453 U.S. 280, 280–85 (1981). Some agents were attacked after these disclosures. Id. at 285. 
Agee’s disclosures also violated his contract with the government, which required him to submit public 
statements regarding his activities to the government for preclearance, and barred him from disclosing 
confidential information. Id. at 284; see United States v. Snepp, 444 U.S. 507, 515–16 (1980) 
(upholding the enforcement of such contracts). But see Koh, supra note 202, at 140 (critiquing Agee as 
giving short shrift to free speech). 
 213. United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1083 (4th Cir. 1988) (Wilkinson, J., concurring) 
(observing that without the ability to enforce confidentiality agreements through prosecutions under 
the Espionage Act, “[v]ital decisions and expensive programs set into motion by elected 
representatives would be subject to summary derailment at the pleasure of one disgruntled 
employee”). 
 214. Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. § 421(a) (1982) (providing for up to 
ten years imprisonment for person who violates Act). 
 215. 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988). 
 216. Id. at 527. 
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“constitutional investment of power in the President.”217 Justice 
Blackmun painstakingly detailed the long-standing efforts of the 
executive to protect sensitive information.218 He alluded specifically to 
the formation of the NSA after World War II.219 According to Justice 
Blackmun, the “[p]redictive judgment” involved in assessing both 
whether someone should receive a clearance and the danger if an 
individual failed to comply with a clearance’s terms is inherently an 
“inexact science,” requiring a measure of deference to agency 
decisionmaking.220 Justice Blackmun attributed this same view to 
Congress, even though the statute establishing a scheme for adjudicating 
matters concerning civil service employment did not expressly preclude 
more searching review.221 
As another example of how secrecy and deliberation intersect in 
Congress, consider the authorization of covert action under Title 50 of 
the U.S. Code.222 Congress has authorized covert action, in broad and 
general terms, to aid the government’s deliberation about policy options. 
The statute permits the President to find that covert action abroad serves 
U.S. foreign policy goals and to order action based on that finding, 
subject to oversight by congressional intelligence committees.223 There 
are limits to that authority: the President cannot use a covert action 
finding to order “traditional . . . military activities,” such as a significant, 
ongoing deployment of armed forces abroad.224 Moreover, the United 
States appears to accept that any activities involving the targeted use of 
lethal force abroad must be consistent with international law on the use 
of force and the conduct of armed conflict.225 However, a range of 
activities is permissible, including actions that fall short of an “armed 
attack” on another state forbidden by the U.N. Charter but nonetheless 
interfere with that state’s sovereignty in ways that would violate 
 
 217. Id.  
 218. Id. 527–28. 
 219. Id. at 527. 
 220. Id. at 529. 
 221. See id. at 531 n.6 (citation omitted). But see Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: 
Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 783, 851 (2011) (arguing 
against undue deference to the executive branch). See generally Robert M. Chesney, National Security 
Fact Deference, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1361 (2009) (analyzing the factors driving judicial deference to 
executive decisions). 
 222. 50 U.S.C. § 3093 (2014); cf. Robert Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law 
of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate, 5 J. Nat’l Sec. L. & Pol’y 539, 540–45 (2010) (discussing the 
differences and similarities between covert action and military operations). 
 223. 50 U.S.C. § 3093(b)(1) (2014) (requiring that the President keep intelligence committees 
“fully and currently informed of all covert actions”). 
 224. Id. § 3093(e)(2). 
 225. See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Keynote Address at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and International 
Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm. 
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international law.226 Covert action authority expands the options 
available, since many activities the President can order based on a covert 
action finding would be effectively precluded if the United States was 
obliged to publicly acknowledge them.227 
The covert nature of the activities undertaken can also pose 
challenges for deliberation.228 The ability to authorize actions without 
public debate can allow “groupthink” to operationalize bad ideas.229 This 
was the case, for example, with U.S. policy toward Iran in the 1950s and 
Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1960s and 1970s.230 Groupthink 
also plagued the Bush administration’s TSP, which lacked the statutory 
grounding and judicial and legislative oversight of the metadata 
program.231 My object here is not to defend particular policies. Rather, I 
aim only to demonstrate that Congress has regularly used vague terms 
such as “covert action” and narrower forms of oversight, such as 
reporting to the intelligence committees, to widen the range of policy 
options available in the national security space. A broader reading of 
section 215’s relevance standard, coupled with both intelligence 
committee oversight and court review, would be consistent with 
Congress’s desire to broaden policy options. 
3. Technology, Secrecy, and National Security 
The courts have also tended to show deference to government 
decisions on technology and national security. In granting this deference, 
courts have recognized that a failure to show deference could confine 
technology to the status quo, chilling innovation.232 Moreover, courts 
have recognized that requiring public disclosure of surveillance methods 
 
 226. Jules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten Power, 
134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1035, 1040 (1986). 
 227. Id. at 1078. 
 228. See Griffin, supra note 172, at 103–04. 
 229. See Chesney, supra note 221, at 1414–16 (2009); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should 
Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 Yale L.J. 1011, 1029–30, 1035–37 (2003); 
Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security Decisions, and the 
Rule of Law, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 195, 204–11 (2010). 
 230. See Lobel, supra note 226, at 1056–57. 
 231. See Kathleen Clark, The Architecture of Accountability: A Case Study of the Warrantless 
Surveillance Program, 2010 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 357, 394–95; Heidi Kitrosser, It Came from Beneath the 
Twilight Zone: Wiretapping and Article II Imperialism, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 1401, 1406–11 (2010). 
President Franklin Roosevelt ordered wiretapping of suspected spies in the lead-up to America’s entry 
into World War II. See Neal Katyal & Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the 
Legality of the NSA Surveillance Program: The FDR Precedent, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1023, 1049–54 
(2008). The secretive and convoluted nature of this effort make it a doubtful precedent for the TSP. Id. 
at 1062–70. By the same token, the metadata program’s legality does not hinge on assessments of the 
lawfulness of either Roosevelt’s surveillance initiative or the TSP, since in section 215 Congress 
expressly empowered the FISC to approve surveillance requests from the executive branch. Id. at 
1029–32.  
 232. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984). 
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would allow terrorists and other adversaries to “adapt” to those methods 
and thereby evade detection.233 In addition, courts have viewed 
technological advances as a shield as well as a sword, possessing the 
potential to enhance privacy and enable curbs on government 
overreaching.234 
The courts’ deference to the executive branch on technology was 
evident in the Supreme Court’s canonical decision on deference to 
agencies, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.235 
Often, courts defer because of agencies’ superior expertise. As the 
Chevron Court noted in deferring to an agency policy on ways to reduce 
air pollution, an agency construes a statute, “not in a sterile textual 
vacuum, but in the context of implementing policy decisions in a 
technical and complex arena.”236 That complexity makes it far more risky 
and cumbersome for courts to either second-guess agency decisions 
developed over time by experts or to require express authorization from 
Congress for new technologies. 
The first point here is most obvious: Executive agencies have access 
to information on a far broader scale than courts.237 Courts that second-
guess agencies risk getting it wrong. 
The second point requires more unpacking. Requiring express 
authorization from Congress obliges executive branch officials to 
repeatedly return to Congress for permission to employ new technology. 
That requirement has some advantages for deliberation and individual 
rights, but it also has two key drawbacks: (1) in the national security 
field, it increases the risk that some technological advances will be 
disclosed before it is in the United States’ interest to disclose them, and 
(2) it makes the implementation of new technology far more unwieldy. 
Two important cases on secrecy illustrate the first problem. In 
United States v. Reynolds, the Supreme Court held that the government 
could invoke the state secrets privilege to shield an accident report 
prepared by the Air Force on the crash of a B-29 bomber in litigation 
brought by the widows of the victims.238 At the time of the accident, the 
bomber in question was testing an early version of a “pilotless aircraft 
guidance system,”239 although the documents that the plaintiffs requested 
 
 233. See Kennedy v. United Kingdom, App. No. 26839/05, ¶ 140, Eur. Ct. H.R. (May 18, 2010). 
 234. See, e.g., In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [Name Redacted by the Court], No. BR 08-13, 
2009 WL 9150913, at *9–10 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009). 
 235. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 236. Id. at 863. 
 237. Cf. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005) (observing 
that, when compared with courts, agencies are “better equipped to make . . . difficult policy choices”). 
 238. 345 U.S. 1, 9–12 (1953). 
 239. See David Rudenstine, The Irony of a Faustian Bargain: A Reconsideration of the Supreme 
Court’s 1953 United States v. Reynolds Decision, 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 1283, 1300 (2013). 
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contained no mention of this aspect of the case.240 The government 
alleged that disclosure of the accident report was “prejudicial to the 
efficient operation” of the Air Force, “not in the public interest,” and 
“inconsistent with national security.”241 The Supreme Court agreed that 
the government could decline to disclose the documents, which in fact 
merely listed tragically mundane errors in aircraft maintenance.242 
Rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim that in camera review of the accident 
report would suffice to determine whether it contained references to 
sensitive information, the Court asserted that even disclosure to a judge 
could result in compromising sources and methods.243 Noting that 
“new[] . . . electronic devices have greatly enhanced the effective use of 
air power,” the Court opined that “electronic devices must be kept secret 
if their full military advantage is to be exploited in the national 
interests.”244 The Court declined to order production of the accident 
report, finding a “reasonable danger that the accident investigation 
report would contain references to the secret electronic equipment which 
was the primary concern of the mission.”245 
A second decision that refined the Court’s approach to secrecy, 
technology, and deference is CIA v. Sims.246 In Sims, on which Judge 
Kollar-Kotelly relied in her FISC opinion on Internet metadata, the 
Supreme Court upheld denial of a Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”) request on grounds that even a seemingly innocuous 
disclosure might form part of a “mosaic” that could reveal intelligence 
sources and methods to U.S. adversaries.247 The Sims Court warned that, 
“what may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment 
to one who has a broad view of the scene and may put the questioned 
 
 240. Id. at 1342–43. 
 241. Id. at 1342. These allegations were aggressive if not knowingly misleading. Id. at 1356–57. 
 242. See Stephen Dycus et al., National Security Law 158 (5th ed. 2011). 
 243. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953). 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. Here, as with discussion of Department of the Navy v. Egan, supra note 108, my point is 
not to praise the Supreme Court’s decision. The plaintiffs in Reynolds had strong arguments, although 
it is telling that reviewing courts in this century, having full knowledge of the documents in question, 
have declined to revisit the Supreme Court’s decision. In a 2005 decision declining to open up the 
litigation on grounds that the government had engaged in misrepresentation, the Third Circuit 
deferred to the government’s position that its earlier representations were not false because even the 
mundane information in the accident report could have comprised part of a “mosaic” that was useful 
to U.S. adversaries. Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 391 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005) (suggesting that 
public disclosure of the accident report could have revealed the content of training missions, the unit 
involved, and the capability of the aircraft in the mission, such as the ability to operate at high 
altitudes); cf. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 544 U.S. 139 146–47 (1981) (holding that the 
Court lacked power to compel an environmental impact statement for a Navy facility that might store 
nuclear weapons, in part because of need for secrecy on weapons’ location). 
 246. 471 U.S. 159 (1985) (cited in Kollar-Kotelly Opinion, supra note 48, at 30 n.24). 
 247. Id. at 177. 
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item of information in its proper context.”248 Judicial deference was 
therefore appropriate in assessing the intelligence assessments of the 
executive, which “must of course be familiar with ‘the whole picture,’ as 
judges are not.”249 Such deference was particularly appropriate, the Sims 
Court concluded, “given the magnitude of the national security interests 
and potential risks at stake.”250 
The Sims Court’s mosaic theory, with its stress on judicial deference 
on secrecy, was a reference point for Senator Kyl in discussing the 2006 
amendments to section 215. Discussing limits in the bill on 
telecommunications companies’ disclosure of government requests for 
information, Kyl explained the need for a measure of deference to the 
executive branch’s choices: 
The standard in the conference report . . . recognizes that sensitive 
national security and diplomatic relations judgments are particularly 
within the Executive’s expertise. The Constitution has vested these 
determinations with the Executive, and courts have long recognized 
that judges are ill-suited to be second-guessing the Executive’s national 
security and diplomatic affairs judgments. Disclosures that seem 
innocuous to a judge who . . . must view those disclosures without 
being fully aware of the many other data points known to our 
enemies—may nonetheless be quite damaging.251 
Obliging agencies to return to Congress every time they encounter a 
new technology can also stifle innovation. In today’s world, technological 
change occurs at an astronomical rate.252 Ponder the pitiable fate of the 
Blackberry, hailed as cutting edge technology in one decade and nearing 
collapse less than fifteen years later.253 Even modest alterations in 
technology can render a regulatory regime ready for mothballs.254 
Requiring a trip to Congress for fresh amendments every time 
technological change mooted out a previously effective regulatory 
framework would leave regulators playing Sisyphus. The agency would 
 
 248. Id. at 178; cf. David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom 
of Information Act, 115 Yale L.J. 628 (2005) (discussing the rationale for the mosaic theory). 
 249. Id. at 179. 
 250. Id.; see Pozen, Deep Secrecy, supra note 10, at 304–05 (discussing case law upholding 
secrecy). The Court has also invoked the need to preserve secrecy as a basis for denying standing to 
challenge FISA provisions. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1149 n.4 (2013) 
(expressing concern that allowing standing without proof of direct harm would “allow a terrorist . . . to 
determine whether he is currently under U.S. surveillance simply by filing a lawsuit challenging the 
Government’s surveillance program”). 
 251. 152 Cong. Rec. S2437-38 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 252. See Yochai Benkler, Open Wireless vs. Licensed Spectrum: Evidence from Market Adoption, 
26 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 69, 94 (2012) (discussing Moore’s Law, named after one of the founders of the Intel 
Corporation, which holds that the speed and capacity of computing technologies doubles every two years). 
 253. See Ian Austen, BlackBerry Staggers to a Deeper, $4.4 Billion Loss, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 2013, at 
B1. 
 254. See Jonathan Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency Commitments, 
60 Vand. L. Rev. 1021, 1028 (2007). 
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eagerly draft regulations pursuant to a current statutory authorization, 
only to find that technological change had rendered those rules old 
before their time, requiring further legislative activity before starting 
work on a new batch of regulations.255 The cycle would then repeat itself. 
Such adventures in futility would seem quixotic were they not dangerous. 
If adaptability is a watchword for administrative law, allowing 
counterterrorism techniques to lag behind technology in smart phones or 
washing machines seems perverse.256 
However, concern about individual rights requires some limits on 
the government’s ability to use new technology in information gathering. 
Consider the dynamic world of data analytics. Through the 1980s, much 
analysis of data required teams of workers engaged in reading and 
digesting documents.257 Law firms and other concerns that used this 
technique billed clients for thousands of hours. In the last twenty-five 
years, data analysis has shifted to the use of keywords for searching 
documents electronically.258 The last fifteen years have seen substantial 
advances in computerized coding of huge document sets. Predictive 
coding uses a “seed set” of documents that analysts compile using 
keywords. The seed set “trains” software that enables a computer to find 
documents relevant to a lawsuit in a much larger set.259 While the 
adoption of this technology is still gathering steam in civil litigation, data 
aggregators in the private retail sector have forged ahead in training 
software to draw connections between Internet consumers’ search 
patterns, personal data (such as residence or computer ownership), and 
purchasing and borrowing proclivities.260 Advanced data analytics can be 
dystopian, giving major corporations or government too large a window 
on individuals’ habits and commitments.261 Use of such data mining 
 
 255. Id. 
 256. But see Kerr, supra note 155, 26–30 (arguing for requiring express congressional authorization 
of new technology). 
 257. For a balanced analysis of data analytics compared with hard copy research on the history of 
cinema, see Richard Abel, The Pleasures and Perils of Big Data in Digitized Newspapers, 25 Film 
Hist. 1, 2 (2013) (noting that analyzing databases of newspapers yielded information that would have 
been far more difficult to obtain from print sources about the popularity of pro-German movies in 
America before U.S. entry into World War I). 
 258. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 846 F. Supp. 11, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that 
“relevant documents can be isolated through key-word searching,” so there was no need to produce 
the entire “computer storage device”). 
 259. See Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 186–87 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); cf. John 
Didday, Informed Buyers of E-Discovery: Why General Counsel Must Become Tech Savvy, 
5 Hastings Sci. & Tech. L.J. 281, 303–05 (2013) (discussing the promise of advanced machine learning 
in e-discovery). 
 260. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 
2010, 2021–22 (2013). 
 261. See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy is For, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1904, 1919–27 (2013); cf. Dahlia 
Lithwick & Steve Vladeck, Taking the “Meh” out of Metadata: How the Government Can Discover Your 
Health Problems, Political Beliefs, and Religious Practices Using Just Your Metadata, Slate (Nov. 22, 2013), 
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methods to identify suspected terrorists from bulk metadata could be 
problematic, particularly in the domestic realm.262 Methods of this kind 
should require express congressional approval. Fortunately, in this 
respect the uses of technology approved by the FISC for metadata 
queries appear quaint, relying on simple identifiers, such as phone 
numbers. 
C. Technological Innovation Can Both Enhance and Check the 
Power of Surveillance 
Conceding that some technological innovations in surveillance 
would require a return visit to Congress, we can ask whether the FISC is 
capable of holding that line. Although the initial implementation of the 
metadata program has spurred critics’ doubts, the FISC’s overall track 
record suggests that it is capable of robust review. The FISC’s efforts are 
aided by the two-sided character of technological change. The first and 
more obvious aspect is the intrusive power of new technologies. The 
second more subtle element is the dynamic ability to devise technological 
safeguards against intrusions. Focusing only on the first aspect distorts 
law and policy. In contrast, a balanced approach permits orderly 
development of technology while still preserving privacy rights and 
Congress’s opportunity to deliberate about quantum leaps in surveillance 
capabilities. 
Courts have striven for a balanced approach in regulating digital 
searches that seeks neither to stifle nor surrender to “[r]apid changes in 
the dynamics of communication and information transmission itself.”263 
In City of Ontario v. Quon, the Supreme Court adopted a balanced 
approach to an employer’s investigation of employee texting, observing 
that “[p]rudence counsels caution . . . [lest] facts . . . are used to establish 
far-reaching premises.”264 The Court opted for a narrow holding based 
on the employer’s legitimate interest in ascertaining whether a contract 
 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/11/nsa_and_metadata_how_the_govern
ment_can_spy_on_your_health_political_beliefs.html (discussing the potential for invasions of privacy by the 
government). 
 262. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 561–63 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (using the “mosaic” 
concept not as justification for government secrecy, as in CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985), but as test 
for when government aggregation of information about individuals’ non-private activities might reveal 
more than information about any one activity, thus violating an individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy and triggering Fourth Amendment protection); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); 
cf. Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the First Amendment, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 311, 345–52 (2012) 
(raising concerns about whether the mosaic theory is coherent and manageable, particularly in light of 
rapidly evolving technology); Wayne A. Logan, “Mosaic Theory” and Megan’s Laws, 2011 Cardozo 
L. Rev. 95, 96–97 (suggesting a parallel between the mosaic theory and other law enforcement policies, 
such as mandated disclosures to the government by convicted sex offenders). 
 263. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010). 
 264. Id. 
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for text messaging services on company-provided pagers resulted in 
“extensive” personal communications by employees.265 In finding that 
the employer, a law enforcement agency, acted reasonably, the Court 
also cited the tailored nature of the employer’s search of employees’ text 
messages, which included only two months of the relevant contractual 
period.266 
The pace of technological change does not dictate a pro-government 
result. After Quon, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Jones, in 
which it held that law enforcement officials violated the Fourth 
Amendment by attaching a GPS device to a suspect’s car without a 
warrant and tracking the car’s movements for a month.267 In Jones, 
Justice Alito’s concurrence sounded a warning about technological 
change that removed practical checks on law enforcement surveillance of 
an individual’s movements.268 This evolving ease led the Court to restrict 
GPS surveillance.269 However, Justice Alito also hinted that restrictions 
on GPS surveillance in the domain of ordinary criminal law, such as 
investigations of drug trafficking, might not be wise or constitutionally 
necessary in areas with greater stakes.270 
The Court’s decision in Riley v. California, holding that the “search 
incident to arrest” doctrine did not permit a warrantless digital search of 
a defendant’s cell phone, also curbs ordinary law enforcement without 
addressing national security surveillance.271 In Riley, Chief Justice 
Roberts, writing for a unanimous court, observed that police officers 
making an arrest should not automatically gain access to the “sum of an 
individual’s private life” contained on today’s cell phones.272 Chief 
Justice Roberts also noted that the rich “combination” of digital data on 
an individual’s cell phone might yield far more about an individual’s 
“private interests and concerns” than might be apparent from a single 
record viewed in isolation.273 Chief Justice Roberts also discounted the 
value of “‘protocols’” developed internally by law enforcement to 
address the problem of access to additional reams of information stored 
 
 265. Id. at 761. 
 266. Id. 
 267. 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012). 
 268. Id. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that, “[t]raditional surveillance for any extended 
period of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken”). 
 269. However, Justice Alito also acknowledged that technological change could work in the 
opposite direction, paving the way for “periods in which popular expectations are in flux . . . [n]ew 
technology may provide increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many people 
may find the tradeoff worthwhile.” Id. at 962. 
 270. Id. at 964. 
 271. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493–95 (2014). 
 272. Id. at 2489. 
 273. Id. at 2489–90. 
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on the cloud.274 Chief Justice Roberts said, damning with faint praise, 
that this was “[p]robably a good idea,” but then tartly noted that “the 
Founders did not fight a revolution to gain the right to government 
agency protocols.”275  
However, Chief Justice Roberts limited the implications of this 
concern about government access to combined data. He noted that the 
issue arose in Riley in the context of a conceded Fourth Amendment 
search.276 Nothing in the Court’s opinion addresses the legality under the 
Fourth Amendment of government collection of noncontent data such as 
call records that an individual has already made available to a third 
party. 
Justice Alito added a concurrence in Riley that echoed the concern 
of legislators like Senator Kyl that technological change also enhanced 
the capacities of criminals. “Cell phones are of great value for both 
lawful and unlawful purposes,” Justice Alito observed, and “[t]hey can 
be used in committing many serious crimes.”277 Chief Justice Roberts 
acknowledged this point in his opinion, agreeing that cell phones are 
“important tools in facilitating coordination and communication among 
members of criminal enterprises.”278 For Justice Alito, this suggested that 
deference to the legislature would be useful in weighing the balance 
between privacy and law enforcement. As Justice Alito put it, 
“Legislatures, elected by the people, are in a better position than 
[courts] . . . to assess and respond to the changes that have already 
occurred and those that almost certainly will take place in the future.”279 
While the core privacy protections built into the Fourth Amendment 
fully support giving the Court the last word on the immediate question 
before it in Riley, Justice Alito’s point underscores the wisdom of Justice 
Powell’s opinion for the Court in Keith, which invited Congress to 
address the difficult issues of national security surveillance. Such 
deference has even more resonance in the context of U.S. surveillance 
abroad, where courts have acknowledged that daunting deficits in the 
ability to gain and analyze data require a measure of deference to the 
political branches.280 
In taking the balance between effectiveness and intrusion seriously, 
courts have often used technological innovation as a means for 
controlling Fourth Amendment searches of content. For example, courts 
have inserted search protocols in warrants authorizing law enforcement 
 
 274. Id. at 2491. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. at 2489 n.1. 
 277. Id. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 278. Id. at 2493. 
 279. Id. at 2497–98 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 280. See, e.g., United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980). 
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inspection of laptops that limit the time of inspection, the domains of the 
computer that law enforcement can access, and even the keywords that 
law enforcement officials use to conduct their search.281 Corporations 
routinely use blocking filters and other technology to limit customers’ 
ability to search online content.282 Constraints on search protocols allow 
the court to limit the breadth and intrusiveness of the government’s 
search, and prevent the government from relying on invidious criteria 
such as political, cultural, or religious views.283 
This quest for balance in searches of content has important 
ramifications for noncontent information gathering that Congress 
believed, based on long-standing Supreme Court precedent, did not raise 
Fourth Amendment issues.284 A balanced approach to metadata 
collection would acknowledge that technological advances, such as 
blocking filters and analogous controls, can impose meaningful 
constraints on government data analysts. Filters and other automated 
controls can prevent a data analyst from gaining access to data without 
using preapproved key words or other search terms. As in the Fourth 
Amendment context, judicial review of search requests can require the 
use of such technical controls.285 While talented data analysts might try to 
engineer ways to frustrate these controls, that possibility does not render 
controls useless. The solution is to build in ways of monitoring such 
attempts and require training that emphasizes compliance. Courts 
monitor compliance with search protocols in the Fourth Amendment 
context, dealing with myriad law enforcement agencies. If compliance is 
possible there, it should also be possible in the bulk collection of 
metadata. Congress’s inclusion of the provision for FISC review in 
section 215 suggests that Congress wanted the court to craft conditions 
 
 281. See United States v. Reeves, Crim. No. 11-520 JBS, 2012 WL 1806164, at *9–11 (D. N.J. May 
17, 2012) (holding that keyword searching without date limitation specified in warrant violated Fourth 
Amendment); cf. Nathan Alexander Sales, Run for the Border: Laptop Searches and the Fourth 
Amendment, 43 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1091, 1121–22 (2009) (praising search protocols in laptop searches); 
Athul K. Acharya, Note, Semantic Searches, 63 Duke L.J. 393, 409–23 (2013) (analyzing search 
protocols in Fourth Amendment cases). 
 282. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 286–87 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting 
that Google uses technology to limit Google Books searches of certain volumes; to prevent visitors 
from reading the entire volume, visitors must use the “snippet-view” mode that shows just three 
excerpts for each search term employed and imposes other restrictions). 
 283. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. 621 F.3d 1162, 1173 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(en banc). A noted scholar who initially favored this development has more recently cautioned that 
courts have become too wedded to search protocols, which can skew both investigations and the 
development of the law. Courts considering the lawfulness of digital searches may focus too much on 
the mechanical issue of whether law enforcement complied with the terms of the search protocol, and 
less on whether officials acted reasonably. See Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search 
and Seizure, 96 Va. L. Rev. 1241, 1255–57 (2010). 
 284. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741–43 (1979). 
 285. See In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [Name Redacted by the Court], No. BR 08-13, 2009 
WL 9150913, at *9–10 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009). 
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on access to data that would balance privacy and security. The FISC’s 
conditions met this objective.286 
IV.  Metadata in Practice: The 2009 Disclosures Regarding 
Noncompliance 
 The deference to the executive described above is a persuasive 
precedent for the framework in place prior to Snowden’s revelations. 
The data collected by the government is substantial, exceeding in scale, if 
not in kind, the data acquired in typical subpoenas.287 Judicial controls 
are also greater, narrowing access to the data thus acquired. However, 
the FISC’s robust role in enforcing its own controls emerged from a crisis 
in the program. Moreover, the executive’s disclosures to Congress on this 
crisis barely crossed the adequacy threshold. Here, the dynamic 
conception must dovetail with reform. 
Until the Snowden revelations, metadata’s biggest challenge 
occurred in 2009. In January of 2009, the Justice Department informed 
the FISC of significant shortfalls in the NSA’s compliance with judicial 
controls.288 The FISC fashioned stringent remedies, which the NSA has 
implemented.289 However, dealing with the substantive problem is only 
part of the story. Providing the best possible information to Congress is 
still a work in progress. 
Some background on the 2009 issues is helpful. As noted in Part I, 
the government received approval from the FISC in 2006 to collect 
metadata concerning phone calls on a rationale similar to the one used 
by Judge Kollar-Kotelly in 2004 to authorize collection of Internet 
communications.290 That approval was conditioned on a requirement that 
the government query the metadata only with identifiers that were RAS-
approved.291 
There was one substantial problem with implementation of the 
metadata program from its 2006 FISC authorization to early 2009: the 
NSA did not fully comply with the FISC’s restrictions on identifiers.292 A 
Justice Department lawyer brought this compliance issue to the FISC’s 
 
 286. See infra notes 298–99 and accompanying text. 
 287. Cf. Kris, supra note 59, at 24 (discussing the differences between the scale and scope of 
traditional subpoenas and the metadata program, respectively).  
 288. In re Prod. of Tangible Things, 2009 WL 9150913, at *4–7. 
 289. See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [Name 
Redacted by the Court], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *10–14 (FISA Ct. Oct. 11, 2013). 
 290. See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from 
[Name Redacted by Court], No. BR 06-05, 2006 WL 7137486 (FISA Ct. May 24, 2006).  
 291. Id. at *2. 
 292. See In re Prod. of Tangible Things, 2009 WL 9150913, at *4–6; Donohue, supra note 6, at 807–
08. See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, 2006 WL 
7137486. 
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attention in January 2009.293 Judge Walton of the FISC rightly 
characterized these compliance issues as substantial, explaining that 
almost ninety percent of all identifiers used were not RAS-approved.294 
Moreover, no lawyer or NSA official had previously disclosed this 
compliance problem to the court, although many submissions by the 
government had flatly asserted that the NSA was complying with the 
2006 FISC order. Judge Walton suggested that this prolonged period of 
noncompliance constituted either a willful and substantial 
“misrepresentation” or a failure of the NSA to even understand the 
FISC’s conditions.295 
Through early 2009, in other words, the metadata program did not 
reflect the balance between data acquisition, secrecy, and privacy 
protections that a dynamic framework requires. Critics of the metadata 
program have argued that the FISC should have simply shut down the 
program in response to these problems.296 However, that response would 
have left a gap in intelligence gathering capabilities that the FISC was 
rightly reluctant to create.297 Instead, the FISC imposed relief that 
remedied noncompliance. For example, for several months in 2009, the 
NSA had to submit to the FISC for preapproval all requests to designate 
identifiers, unless an emergency existed.298 The FISC also ordered the 
NSA to perform an “end-to-end” review that would diagnose compliance 
issues and suggest solutions.299 
While one can argue that as of January 2009, the government 
disclosed implementation problems to the FISC and took its medicine, 
whether the executive branch adequately informed Congress is a closer 
question. The best answer is that the government performed adequately 
because it informed the intelligence committees of compliance issues and 
included relevant FISC opinions. Legislators so inclined could read the 
court decisions and draw their own conclusions. Senator Wyden became 
an avid student of the FISC’s jurisprudence.300 His persistent criticism of 
the bulk collection program owed much to information that the executive 
 
 293. See Donohue, supra note 6, at 808; Lizza, supra note 10, at 56. 
 294. In re Prod. of Tangible Things, 2009 WL 9150913, at *4 n.2. 
 295. Id. at *6–8. 
 296. See Donohue, supra note 6, at 814. 
 297. In re Prod. of Tangible Things, 2009 WL 9150913, at *17 (deciding not to order cessation of 
metadata collection because of the government’s “repeated representations that the collection 
of . . . [business record] metadata is vital to national security” and “the Court’s prior determinations 
that, if the program is conducted in compliance with appropriate minimization procedures, such 
collection conforms with 50 U.S.C. § 1861”). 
 298. See id. at *18–19; Donohue, supra note 6, at 819. 
 299. In re Prod. of Tangible Things, 2009 WL 9150913, at *9–10. 
 300. See Lizza, supra note 10, at 60 (reporting that, “Wyden . . . had read the court opinions”). 
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branch had provided.301 However, the government’s own summaries of 
those FISC decisions were less specific than they should have been. 
The government’s descriptions of the compliance issues failed to 
convey the breadth of noncompliance or adequately assess blame. For 
example, the government disclosed, in late February 2009, to the House 
Intelligence Committee that in January it had uncovered episodes of 
noncompliance.302 The February memorandum did not provide the 
comprehensive information that is ideal for sound legislative oversight. 
In the memo, the NSA General Counsel reported cryptically that an 
“automated alert process” used to query the metadata “did not operate 
in conformity with the Court’s orders.”303 While this characterization was 
correct, it started a trend that would continue in subsequent disclosures 
of ascribing failures to automation and letting the humans off the hook. 
A December report to the Intelligence Committee also blamed the 
machines.304 It ascribed NSA noncompliance to the “implementation of 
highly sophisticated technology in a complex and ever-changing 
communications environment which, in some instances, resulted in the 
automated tools operating in a manner that was not completely 
consistent with the specific terms of the” FISC’s decrees.305 The report’s 
scapegoating of those pesky “automated tools” obscures far more than it 
enlightens. Automated search tools function in the report like rogue 
robots in a 1950s science fiction movie. NSA officials are cast as hapless 
victims of the robots’ revolt. However, despite the sophistication of the 
NSA’s tools, the agency has not taken up residence on the set of the next 
installment of Star Trek. At the NSA, humans are in charge. Indeed, the 
most puzzling aspect of the December report is its sense that the “rogue 
robots” narrative was somehow favorable to the agency. After all, if 
NSA officials lack the competence to handle their own creations, the 
nation is in far worse trouble than even Edward Snowden believes. 
The fault with these memos was not merely the leaden quality of the 
officials’ prose. To best perform oversight, the House Intelligence 
Committee and its Senate counterpart should have received a fuller 
summary of the issues. More comprehensive disclosure would have 
enhanced legislators’ capacity to fully assess the risks and benefits of the 
bulk collection program.306 
 
 301. Id. 
 302. See Memorandum from Vito T. Potenza, Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Sec. Agency to Staff Director, 
House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence (Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/501/25%20Feb%2009%20NSA%20CN_SealedFINAL.pdf. 
 303. Id. 
 304. See Weich, supra note 38, at 4. 
 305. Id.  
 306. The discussion in the text may focus unduly on the phrasing of one report. The December 
2009 report hints that substantial disclosure may have occurred in other settings, including real-time 
exchanges with legislators. Id. (observing that incidents of noncompliance “were reported . . . in great 
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That said, the government’s repeated acknowledgments of 
noncompliance were an adequate signal to Congress that something had 
been amiss. Moreover, by the time of the December 2009 report, the 
government had reason to believe that it had addressed the problems 
that the FISC had identified. The December report detailed those steps 
appropriately. A diligent legislator could have followed up with further 
requests for information. Some did so at the briefings that the 
government provided in connection with reauthorization efforts. Clearly 
Senator Wyden followed up, gaining information that confirmed his 
belief that bulk collection was contrary to section 215, and a bad idea to 
boot.307 While not all legislators followed Senator Wyden’s lead, blame 
for legislative lack of interest should not fall on the executive. Passivity 
on the part of members of Congress is hardly a new phenomenon, or one 
confined to section 215 reauthorizations.308 
However, the lack of specificity in the government’s summaries is a 
red flag that highlights the need for reform. It is disturbing that Congress 
depended on the executive branch for disclosure, as did the FISC. While 
the 2009 disclosures elicited robust remedies from the FISC, new 
problems can arise in the future that the FISC’s current safeguards 
cannot control. More extensive statutory disclosure requirements could 
ameliorate this risk. For example, the government should be required to 
provide both an executive summary and an in-depth analysis of each 
FISC opinion that materially modifies the bulk collection program. It 
should also be required to provide regular reports to the intelligence 
 
detail.”). Those real-time conversations are the most effective kind of executive disclosure to the 
intelligence committees. 
 307. Lizza, supra note 10, at 60. 
 308. To facilitate a broader view of both section 215 and section 702, I do not address in detail 
arguments that, by reauthorizing section 215 on two occasions before Snowden’s revelations, Congress 
ratified the FISC’s interpretation of relevance. For more discussion of the effects of reenactment, see 
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) (cited in Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 239–
40 (2009)); ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 743–45 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); cf. Deborah A. Widiss, 
Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 Tex. L. 
Rev. 859, 871–72 (2012) (noting the principle that “Congress intends to incorporate authoritative 
interpretations of statutory text when it uses language from one statute in a related context”); Einer 
Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 2027, 2112–13 (2002) 
(asserting that, “once the interpretation ‘has been fully brought to the attention of the public and the 
Congress,’” reenactment with other alterations suggests the interpretation is “presumptively correct”). It 
is worth noting, however, that in 2010, the House and Senate intelligence committees wrote to all of the 
members of their respective bodies, noting that the executive was offering each member an opportunity 
to attend a briefing and read a classified report on “important intelligence collection made possible” 
under section 215. The classified report itself described section 215 as entailing the “production of the 
business records . . . relating to substantially all of the telephone calls” handled by U.S. 
telecommunications companies. See Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 745 (emphasis added). That information 
should have alerted a reasonably diligent member of Congress to the stakes involved in reauthorization. 
Margulies_20 (Teixeira CORRECTED).DOC (Do Not Delete) 11/26/2014 2:21 PM 
December 2014] DYNAMIC SURVEILLANCE 49 
committees on search results.309 These reforms will fine-tune Congress’s 
discharge of its oversight duties and produce a more effective dynamic 
collaboration with the executive branch. As we shall see, the difficulties 
inherent in limited congressional oversight also make a strong case for 
creation of a public advocate at the FISC.310 
V.  The Dynamic Conception After Snowden 
The Snowden revelations have triggered a reevaluation of both 
section 215 and section 702. After Snowden, national security 
surveillance programs should have to pass two tests. First, they should be 
adequately tailored. Second, they should be subject to an optimal mix of 
internal and external constraints. 
Tailoring must include both a nexus to legitimate government 
interests and protections against targeting the content of U.S. persons’ 
communications. Tailoring is necessary so that government does not gain 
indiscriminate access, rummaging through the personal data and 
communications of any individual without a legitimate reason rooted in 
national security or the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs. The right mix of 
collection and use restrictions will often be the result of negotiations 
between the political branches, as in legislative efforts pending as of 
August 2014 to modify the section 215 program by requiring that the 
government seek a court order to acquire call records from private 
companies using a “specific selection term.”311 
Pending legislative reform efforts also enhance the mix of internal 
and external constraints governing both collection and surveillance by 
adding a voice to FISC proceedings opposing the government’s position 
and enabling more review of FISC decisions. These reforms seek to 
temper intelligence agencies’ tendency to push the envelope into unduly 
intrusive areas of use and collection. Some constraint by the courts is 
appropriate, given the judiciary’s role, which was acknowledged by 
Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78 as a brake on the passing humors of 
the political branches. That review may be ex ante or ex post, depending 
on the context. A public advocate who can promote a robust adversarial 
process would be helpful in empowering courts. Congressional oversight 
is also vital. 
Each external constraint should complement internal constraints. 
An institutional compliance culture will include checks on analysts’ 
understandable proclivity to search for more data, whatever the source. 
 
 309. Heightened disclosure is one feature of a current bill, the FISA Improvements Act of 2013, 
sponsored by Senator Feinstein of California, that has been approved by the Senate Intelligence 
Committee. See FISA Improvements Act of 2013, S.1631, 113th Cong. (2013).  
 310. See infra note 328 and accompanying text. 
 311. See USA Freedom Act of 2014, S. 2685, 113th Cong. § 103(a) (introduced July 30, 2014).  
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Those checks should include processes already in place in the intelligence 
community, including review by senior officials of selectors and other 
search criteria, particularly queries of content from U.S. persons. 
A. Section 215, Metadata, and Specific Selection Terms 
Proposed legislation introduced in the Senate in July of 2014 after 
negotiations between Senator Leahy and government representatives 
would roll back the metadata program in the wake of Snowden’s 
disclosures. The Leahy bill, even more than the bipartisan bill that 
passed the House in May of 2014,312 would redo the balance between the 
wide collection and narrow use requirements struck by the FISC’s 
authorization of the metadata program. To preclude the bulk collection 
that had drawn critics’ ire, the Leahy bill would prohibit bulk collection 
and authorize the government to seek a court order requesting data from 
phone companies and other private entities based on a “specific selection 
term.”313 If the “specific selection term” language becomes law, courts 
will have to preserve a delicate balance: vindicating Congress’s post-
Snowden intent to limit government collection of U.S. persons’ call 
records, while ensuring that the government continues to have access to 
records that it has previously been able to obtain by subpoena in routine 
criminal investigations. 
The “specific selection term” language in the Leahy bill in essence 
codifies the use restrictions imposed by the FISC when it limited queries 
to searches based on identifiers linked to terrorist groups or other 
foreign powers. The Leahy bill defines “specific selection term” as a term 
that “specifically identifies a person, account, address, or personal 
device, or another specific identifier, that is used by the Government to 
narrowly limit the scope of tangible things sought to the greatest extent 
reasonably practicable, consistent with the purpose for seeking the 
tangible things.”314 The Leahy bill cautions that a specific selection term 
cannot include terms that are unduly broad, such as terms “based on a 
broad geographic region, including a city, State, zip code, or area 
code.”315 While the Leahy bill does an admirable job of tightening up 
criteria for call record information, courts should be wary of interpreting 
 
 312. See Amendment to USA Freedom Act of 2013, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 313. See S. 2685 § 103(a). The transition from government collection to tailored agency access to 
privately-held data will be challenging. Telecommunications companies are wary of holding this 
amount of data, and recent cyber intrusions in the private sector raise doubts about the security of 
such an arrangement. See Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States: 
Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Intelligence, 108th Cong. 4–5 (2014) (statement of Sen. 
Rockefeller, Vice Chairman, Select Comm. on Intelligence). The House bill also requires that 
companies make the data available to the NSA in an accessible format. Ensuring a user-friendly 
platform for the data will require cooperation between the public and private sectors. 
 314. See S. 2685 § 107(k)(3)(A)(i) (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1861). 
 315. See id. § 107(k)(3)(A)(ii)(I). 
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the Leahy bill’s language in an unduly narrow fashion. In particular, this 
language should not be used to prohibit the government from seeking 
information that has been available by an ordinary subpoena in an 
ordinary criminal case. For example, in certain circumstances the 
government may believe that an agent of a foreign power, including a 
terrorist group, has used a computer in a hotel to send e-mails to 
associates, but has used an account that is not presently known. In In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings, Subpoena Duces Tecum, the court upheld the 
validity of a subpoena to obtain all Western Union wire transfers at a 
Kansas City hotel for a two-year period in an investigation of drug 
trafficking activity.316 The court did so despite a claim by the hotel that 
the request would give the government access to the records of many 
individuals unconnected to the investigation. While the government’s 
request was broad, it was the narrowest request likely to obtain the 
information the government sought. A narrower response would 
frustrate the investigation and would therefore not, using the Leahy bill’s 
language, be “consistent with the [government’s] purpose for seeking the 
tangible things.”317 To avoid unduly intruding on innocent individuals’ 
privacy, the Leahy bill, like earlier FISC decisions on section 215, relies 
on minimization procedures.318 
B. Institutional Reform and External Constraints 
The Leahy bill seeks to promote articulation of privacy interests in 
the FISC process, as well as greater judicial review of FISC decisions. It 
authorizes the FISC to appoint an amicus curiae from a pool of five 
advocates who would advocate for privacy and civil liberties319 in a case 
involving a “novel or significant interpretation of law.”320 It also 
empowers the FISC to certify matters to the FISCR, and allows the 
FISCR to certify matters to the Supreme Court. These proposed reforms 
entail a compromise between the position taken by at least one former 
FISC judge that most institutional reforms would disrupt the FISC’s 
operation321 and civil liberties advocates’ view that a robust institutional 
presence was needed to keep the NSA honest.322 These changes sidestep 
potential Article III and Appointments Clause objections to more 
 
 316. 827 F.2d 301, 302–05 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 317. See S. 2685 § 107(k)(3)(A)(i). 
 318. See id. § 104. 
 319. See id. § 401 (adding new subsection (i)(4)(A)(i) to 50 U.S.C. § 103). 
 320. See id. § 401(i)(2)(A). 
 321. See Letter from Hon. John D. Bates, Dir., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, to Sen. Patrick 
Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (Aug. 5, 2014), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Leahyletter.pdf [hereinafter Bates Aug. 2014 Letter]. 
 322. See Marty Lederman & Steve Vladeck, The Constitutionality of a FISA “Special Advocate,” 
Just Security (Nov. 4, 2013, 1:34 PM), http://justsecurity.org/2013/11/04/fisa-special-advocate-
constitution. 
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vigorous reform involving an ongoing institutional role for a public 
advocate. However, these constitutional objections have clear answers. 
Courts would have deferred to the role the Supreme Court gave to 
Congress in the Keith case as the democratic arbiter of competing 
concerns in the national security surveillance domain. Moreover, as a 
policy matter, the combination of amici curiae and certification relied on 
in the Leahy bill may not increase adversarial litigation or judicial review 
of FISC decisions as much as the bill drafters may have hoped. In this 
sense, the compromise could have been more far-reaching. 
Under the Senate bill, the FISC can readily decline to appoint 
amicus curiae to advocate for privacy and civil liberties, as long as the 
court “issues a written finding that such appointment is not 
appropriate.”323 That condition leaves a great deal of discretion with the 
FISC. Since the FISC did not seek to name amicus curiae before 
Snowden and at least one former FISC judge spoke out against the 
proposed change,324 there is some reason to doubt that the FISC will 
pivot to enthusiastic support of amici. 
1. The Policy Case for a Public Advocate 
A more institutionalized public voice at the FISC would be even 
more valuable than reliance on amici curiae for two reasons.325 First, a 
public advocate would enhance the reasoning in FISC decisions. 
Although the FISC was correct in extending a measure of deference to 
the executive on the contours of the section 215 relevance standard in 
place at the time of Snowden’s disclosures, the FISC’s reasoning left 
much to be desired. The 2006 FISC opinion, in particular, is truncated 
and conclusory, offering virtually no analysis.326 The absence of analysis 
is problematic. The deliberation that Hamilton extolled in Federalist No. 
78 as judicial review’s hallmark requires statements of reasons.327 The 
statement of reasons sends a useful signal to audiences for the judge’s 
 
 323. See S. 2685 § 401(i)(2)(A). 
 324. See Bates Aug. 2014 Letter, supra note 321. 
 325. See Lederman & Vladeck, supra note 322. 
 326. See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from 
[Name Redacted by Court], No. BR 06-05, 2006 WL 7137486 (FISA Ct. May 24, 2006). 
 327. Hamilton famously observed that the judiciary has “neither force nor will, but merely 
judgment.” The Federalist No. 78, supra note 12, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton). What distinguishes 
judgment from force and will is the importance of weighing arguments and giving reasons for 
accepting or rejecting those arguments. An elaboration of reasons is also the best way to ensure that a 
decision will not be “arbitrary.” Id. at 471. Hamilton observed that courts avoid arbitrary decisions 
because they are bound by precedents, whose “very considerable bulk . . . must demand long and 
laborious study.” Id. That bulk, which to be sure has only grown since Hamilton’s day, has not accrued 
from the mere recitation of results, but from the exploration of reasons that drive each outcome. Cf. 
Leib et al., supra note 21, at 739 (observing “that judges should be forthright in their opinion writing, 
explaining honestly why they are deciding as they are.”). 
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decision, conveying the judge’s seriousness and ongoing vigilance. In 
contrast, especially in the secret loop of the pre-Snowden metadata 
program, a conclusory approval may send a signal to those who have 
sought judicial authorization that they have more license than the court 
actually intends. This dynamic may have played a role in the compliance 
issues that the FISC was forced to deal with in 2009. 
The presence of a public advocate would prod the FISC to provide 
reasons for its decisions. The advocate would receive all government 
requests. It would be empowered to intervene when it believed that a 
matter raised novel legal issues, or when it certified to the FISC that 
there was a reasonable possibility (ten percent or greater) that the 
government’s request failed to meet the statutory standard. The public 
advocate would present the best legal and factual arguments against the 
government. The court would then have to weigh the arguments, and 
explain why it selected one side. The entire process also signals to the 
government that compliance is a serious matter. 
Second, the seriousness imposed by a public advocate would 
compensate for an even bigger blind spot in the current process: the 
barely adequate disclosure that the government has provided to 
Congress. The “rogue robot” explanation for noncompliance furnished 
by the Justice Department in its December 2009 letter did not supply the 
comprehensive self-appraisal that Congress has a right to expect.328 
While the Leahy bill provides for more transparency, the cabined 
deliberation characteristic of Title 50 oversight may not prove 
sufficiently robust over the long haul. The work of the PCLOB, while 
exceptionally valuable, may also fail to completely close the gap. An 
institutional advocate at the FISC would supplement legislative 
oversight, hedging against future deficits in disclosure to Congress. 
The FISC has asserted that an institutionalized advocate would 
make section 215 authorizations too cumbersome.329 That risk is real, but 
manageable. The Leahy bill includes a provision permitting the 
government to request information on an emergency basis without court 
 
 328. Weich, supra note 38, at 4. 
 329. See Letter from Hon. John D. Bates, Dir., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, to Sen. Dianne 
Feinstein, Chairman, U.S. Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence 2 (Jan. 13, 2014), available at 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/1-13-2014-Ltr-to-DFeinstein-re-FISA.pdf;  
Comments of the Judiciary on Proposals Regarding the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
3–4 (Jan. 10, 2014), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/1-10-2014-
Enclosure-re-FISA.pdf; see also Steve Vladeck, Judge Bates and a FISA “Special Advocate,” 
Lawfare (Feb. 4, 2014, 9:24 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/02/judge-bates-and-a-fisa-special-
advocate (arguing that FISC criticism of the special advocate proposal is unfounded because the 
advocate would only participate in cases involving substantial legal issues and would therefore not clog 
up routine functioning of court; arguing further that, “even the finest jurists can occasionally benefit 
from exposure to . . . arguments that they might not have known to ask for and/or affirmatively seek 
out.”). 
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approval,330 which the FISC also permitted pursuant to a request after 
President Obama’s January 2014 speech. Over time, an advocate should 
fit efficiently into FISC proceedings, minimizing delay. An advocate 
would not appear in the great bulk of FISC cases, but only in those that 
raise important legal issues, or where the public advocate certified to the 
FISC that a nonfrivolous factual question had surfaced. In those cases, 
the familiar analogy to the ex parte nature of warrant requests breaks 
down. In the section 215 context, legal issues have arisen precisely 
because the government does not have to make the showing of 
particularized probable cause that it must make to obtain a warrant. The 
mere process of obtaining a warrant in an ordinary criminal case 
eliminates the issues that have proven most controversial under 
section 215. In addition, if a judge issues a warrant in an ordinary 
criminal case that raises substantial legal issues, that decision will be 
subject to review at a criminal trial, when the defendant moves to 
suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant. In contrast, 
review of FISC decisions is rare.331 
Finally, the prophylactic effect of a public advocate would make up 
for any modest inconvenience. After all, an agency that does not address 
compliance with the requisite diligence ultimately causes far greater 
inefficiency, as the FISC discovered when it placed the NSA on a stern 
remedial regime in 2009. If the presence of an advocate deters another 
compliance meltdown like the one the FISC addressed in 2009, this 
innovation will be well worth any modest inefficiencies that ensue. 
2. The Legal Case for a Public Advocate 
The Leahy bill did not create an institutionalized public advocate. 
Instead, it granted authority to the FISC to request participation by an 
amicus curiae on legal issues. That more modest approach was the 
product of a political compromise with the White House, and perhaps of 
concerns about how a more robust approach would square with 
constitutional requirements. Those constitutional questions stem from 
Article III’s requirement that tribunals exercising the “judicial power” of 
the United States adjudicate only “cases or controversies” and from the 
Appointments Clause’s protection of the President’s power to remove 
inferior officers. I address these issues in turn. 
 
 330. See USA Freedom Act of 2014, S. 2685, 113th Cong. § 102 (introduced July 30, 2014). 
 331. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review has convened only a handful of times. 
For one such occasion, see In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 734–36 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (upholding 
provision of USA Patriot Act that permitted use of evidence obtained through FISA warrant in 
ordinary criminal case when protection of national security or acquisition of foreign intelligence 
information was “significant,” as opposed to “primary,” reason for FISA warrant). 
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a. The Public Advocate and Article III 
Article III’s case or controversy requirement ensures that federal 
courts only hear matters with the concrete adverseness necessary to 
promote the resolution of live factual or legal disputes.332 Federal courts 
do not provide advisory opinions on abstract matters of policy. To steer 
clear of such matters, which are the province of the other branches, the 
Supreme Court has interpreted Article III to require that each party to a 
dispute demonstrate an injury in fact that is more concrete than the 
generalized injury suffered by the public because of policies with which it 
disagrees.333 
Choosing to go the amicus curiae and certification route addressed 
most of the Article III concerns that a public advocate would engender. 
An amicus curiae is not a party to litigation. An amicus cannot initiate or 
agree to settle a lawsuit, and cannot appeal a decision that rejects the 
position taken by the amicus. An amicus is simply a friend of the court, 
who participates in litigation at the court’s request to provide the court 
with helpful information. As a non-party, an amicus is not subject to 
Article III’s case or controversy requirement. That non-party status, 
however, also limits the advantages amicus curiae can offer in opening up 
a process such as FISC proceedings. As a creature of the court, an amicus 
can only play a role when the court chooses to authorize the amicus’s 
participation. As we have seen, it is far from clear that the Leahy bill’s 
provisions will permit the participation that the bill’s drafters may have 
viewed as optimal. 
i. Certification and Its Discontents 
The Leahy bill’s insightful drafters sought to anticipate this concern 
by supplementing provision for amici curiae with a provision for the 
certification of novel legal issues to the FISCR and to the Supreme 
Court. Certification also does not involve Article III problems.334 
However, certification has also triggered sufficient resistance from the 
Supreme Court on prudential grounds.335 Certification’s heyday occurred 
over a century ago. The prospects for reviving it in the FISC context are 
as limited as the prospects for making floppy drives a mainstay of 21st 
century word processing or re-enshrining the VCR as the principal mode 
for recording visual media. 
 
 332. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992). 
 333. Id. at 560. 
 334. See Steve Vladeck, Article III, Appellate Review, and the Leahy Bill: A Response to Orin 
Kerr, Lawfare (July 31, 2014, 10:54 AM) http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/07/article-iii-appellate-
review-and-the-leahy-bill-a-response-to-orin-kerr. 
 335. See infra notes 320–21 and accompanying text. 
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Before demonstrating that certification does not adequately address 
the problem that FISC decisions are unreviewable, it is useful to 
demonstrate that certification does not present problems under Article 
III. Certification involves a lower court requesting that a higher court 
resolve a purely legal issue336 in a case that already meets Article III 
requirements. In a case initiated by a party alleging an injury in fact, 
certification of a legal question to a higher court can resolve legal 
questions expeditiously or avoid conflicting results in disparate forums, 
such as the various federal circuit courts of appeals.337 Certification has a 
long historical pedigree: through much of the nineteenth century, 
certification was the approved route for bringing many matters to the 
Supreme Court, including criminal appeals.338 Today, certification in the 
federal system largely involves federal courts, hearing cases based on 
diversity of citizenship, seeking guidance on state law from a state’s 
highest court.339 Because certification is a device used by courts to seek 
guidance in matters that already meet Article III’s test, its use in the 
FISC process prompts no questions beyond those raised by FISC 
adjudication itself. Those questions, while legitimate, have persuasive 
answers. 
However, the absence of convincing Article III objections to 
certification of FISC decisions does not mean that certification will 
provide the enhanced review that the Leahy bill’s sponsors seek. At the 
Supreme Court level, at least, certification has fallen into severe 
disuse.340 That reticence stems from prudential doctrines and evolving 
 
 336. See United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 168 U.S. 505, 512 (1897); cf. Chicago, Burlington & 
Quincy R.R. Co. v. Williams, 214 U.S. 492, 496 (1909) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court 
should have decided the certified question, as it was issue of “pure law” instead of a mixed question of law 
and fact). 
 337. See United States v. Seale, 558 U.S. 985, 986 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting from dismissal of 
certification) (arguing that certification can “expedite . . . litigation” and “serve the interests . . . of 
legal clarity . . . prosecutorial economy . . . and ‘the proper administration . . . of judicial business.’”); 
compare Amanda L. Tyler, Setting the Supreme Court’s Agenda: Is There a Place for Certification?, 
78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1310, 1322–23 (2010) (discussing virtues of certification), with Hon. Bruce M. 
Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Silly Question . . . , 29 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 677, 689 (1995) (arguing 
that certification often produces inefficient litigation, particularly when the record in a case is 
“insufficiently developed to permit a dispositive answer[]” on the relevant question of law). 
 338. Tyler, supra note 337, at 1323. 
 339. See, e.g., In re Thelen LLP, No. 12-4138, 2014 WL 2931526, at *1–2 (Ct. App. July 1, 2014) 
(based on certification from United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, determining that 
hourly fee matters that originated with a now dissolved law firm are not property of the dissolved law 
firm, and that transfer of those matters to former partners in that firm now working at other firms is 
not a fraudulent transfer under New York law). 
 340. See Seale, 558 U.S. at 986 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that at the Supreme Court, “[t]he 
certification process has all but disappeared in recent decades.”). The Supreme Court last accepted a 
case on certification in 1981. The Court disposed of that certification with a ministerial step that 
suggested no appetite for continued engagement. See Iran Nat’l Airlines Corp. v. Marschalk Co., 453 
U.S. 919, 919–20 (1981) (in litigation concerning claims against Iran, referring certifying circuit court to 
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views of court management.341 At least one distinguished federal 
appellate judge, who coincidentally later served on the FISCR, has also 
suggested that certification is often unwise because isolating purely legal 
questions is not as easy as it sounds.342 While academics may teach law 
from casebooks, practicing lawyers and judges know that the holdings 
memorialized in casebooks grow out of full records. Deciding a legal 
question without the benefit of that complete record may lead to a 
decision that lacks grounding in the practical dimensions of commercial, 
political, or administrative life.343 
Mindful of these concerns, both the FISCR and the Supreme Court 
may well resist hearing FISC certifications on the merits. Separating 
factual issues from purely legal points will be difficult, since so much 
turns on the continually changing nature of communications.344 Because 
of the pace of technological change, even a record compiled a year 
before an appellate decision may be obsolete. Deciding a case without 
any record, as certification requires, would be an exercise in rank 
speculation. Other questions mix law and fact from the outset. As an 
example, consider the question of whether a “specific selection term” 
could be a particular hotel server, when the intelligence agency believes 
that a terrorist has been a guest at the hotel but may be using a 
previously unknown e-mail account. That question could turn on factual 
matters, such as the NSA’s capacity to retrieve the information through 
other, less restrictive means. As a mixed question of law and fact, this 
issue would be unsuited for certification.345 In short, although the Leahy 
bill’s reliance on certification signals that Congress wants more review of 
FISC decisions, it is far from clear that certification will achieve that goal. 
 
the Supreme Court’s decision upholding Iranian claims settlement by the President in Dames & 
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981)). 
 341. See Wisniewski v. United States, 353 U.S. 901, 902 (1957) (per curiam) (dismissing 
certification to the Supreme Court to resolve splits among different panels of the same circuit on the 
grounds that the circuit court could promote uniformity by hearing the issue en banc); cf. Edward A. 
Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 
Colum. L. Rev. 1643, 1711 (2000) (discussing reasons for certification’s decline); Tyler, supra note 337, 
1322–23 (same). 
 342. See Hartnett, supra note 341, at 1711. 
 343. See Selya, supra note 337, at 689 (suggesting that a prudent court will virtually always find a 
full record useful to making an informed decision).  
 344. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497–98 (2014) (citing the changing nature of 
communications in a ruling barring the incidental digital search of cell phones pursuant to the arrest of 
a suspect). 
 345. The FISC might transform this into a purely legal question by determining that no narrower 
means would suffice to retrieve the information. Those findings, however, would effectively determine 
the case, leaving the Supreme Court with little or nothing to decide. 
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ii. Warrants, Article III, and the Lessons of History 
The uncertain benefits of amici curiae and certification stand in 
contrast with the more vigorous debate that a true public advocate would 
promote at the FISC. This more robust institutional reform would not 
present irremediable legal problems under Article III or the 
Appointments Clause. To see why, we need to consider the history of 
warrant applications and the deference that the Supreme Court signaled 
in Keith was owed to Congress in establishing procedures for national 
security surveillance. 
In considering the Article III question, it is best to start with the 
opinion by the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) of the Justice 
Department that Congress relied on in drafting FISA in 1978.346 The 
OLC opinion is generally viewed as a definitive statement of law within 
the executive branch, with some precedential effect on subsequent 
executive branch action. In addition, courts, in the nearly four decades 
since FISA’s enactment, have ruled in a fashion that is consistent with 
the OLC memorandum.347 While the Supreme Court has not yet weighed 
in, the unbroken practice of courts in a matter weighted with national 
security concerns counsels caution in dislodging settled understandings. 
The OLC opinion stressed that traditional warrants did not present 
Article III problems.348 According to the OLC, warrant applications 
were “cases and controversies” within the meaning of Article III because 
they involved two parties with divergent interests: the government, which 
was seeking authority to conduct surveillance, and the target of the 
surveillance, who presumably wished to avoid the harm of being 
monitored. As a court that opined early on regarding FISA’s consistency 
with Article III found, neither traditional warrants nor FISA involved “a 
desire for an abstract declaration of law.”349 Moreover, the mere fact that 
an application is made ex parte, by only one side, does not present 
Article III problems.350 As the Supreme Court said in Pope v. United 
States, when a party goes to court to seek enforcement of a legal right, 
the “uncontested” nature of the claim does not affect its classification as 
 
 346. See Memorandum from John M. Harmon, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to 
Hon. Edward P. Boland, Chairman, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence (Apr. 18, 1978), 
in Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance: Hearings on H.R. 5794, H.R. 9745, H.R. 7308, and 
H.R. 5632 Before the Subcomm. on Legis. of the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th 
Cong. 26, 31 (1978) [hereinafter Subcomm. Hearings]. 
 347. See, e.g., United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 348. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 346, at 28. 
 349. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. at 1196 (citing In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 567 (1945)). 
 350. Id.; Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 346, at 28; Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 11 (1944); cf. 
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357–58 (1978) (in upholding judicial immunity regarding ex parte 
sterilization, the Court stated that nothing in state law prohibited the exercise of jurisdiction over an ex 
parte order). 
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a case or controversy.351 A dispute satisfies the case or controversy test 
when one party seeks to establish a sufficiently specific legal claim or 
position.352 The crucial issue is whether a party could assert her rights, 
not whether a party is actually asserting her rights in this particular phase 
of litigation. 
The history provided in Justice Powell’s opinion for the Court in 
Keith fits this view of the interaction of warrant applications and Article 
III.353 The Fourth Amendment crystallized leading English jurists’ 
practice of insisting on an approval of warrants by a neutral magistrate354 
who was “independent of the police and prosecution.”355 Justice Powell 
cited Lord Mansfield’s pathbreaking opinion in Leach v. Three of the 
King’s Messengers356 on the need for a neutral magistrate. The Framers 
were familiar with this line of cases.357 Moreover, the Framers clearly 
believed that the Constitution, even prior to the addition of the Bill of 
Rights, preserved the ancient, unwritten “rights of Englishmen” that the 
leaders of the American Revolution claimed had been trampled by King 
George III and the British Parliament, including the right to neutral 
checks on unbridled law enforcement.358 It would be inconsistent with 
the Framers’ intent to interpret Article III as barring federal judges from 
this checking role. While the Court has held that even lowly court clerks 
can issue warrants,359 surely independence is best ensured by providing 
for the issuance of warrants by Article III judges protected by lifetime 
tenure. Justice Powell’s opinion for the Court in Keith never mentioned 
any Article III problems with the “traditional Fourth Amendment 
requirement [that] . . . a neutral and detached magistrate” approve 
 
 351. Pope, 323 U.S. at 11. 
 352. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 346, at 28; In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 911 
(Spec. Ct. 1974). 
 353. Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972). 
 354. Id. 
 355. See Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 347–49 (1972). 
 356. (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1075 (K.B.) 1088 (noting, in the opinion by Lord Mansfield, that, “[t]he 
magistrate ought to judge” the scope of an arrest warrant, and “give certain directions to the officer[]” 
executing the warrant, rather than relying on that officer’s discretion) (cited in Keith, 407 U.S. at 316). 
 357. David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1739, 1799 
(2000) (noting that broad warrants executed in the 1760s on English dissidents were invalidated on a 
range of grounds by English courts, including the absence of prior approval by a neutral magistrate, and 
that this judicial safeguard was important to the Framers). But see id. at 1800 (noting that English 
precedents from the Revolutionary era focused on several factors that resist refinement into a single test). 
 358. Cf. Steven G. Calabresi et al., State Bills of Rights in 1787 and 1791: What Individual Rights 
Are Really Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 85 S. Calif. L. Rev. 1451, 1456–57 
(2012) (noting rhetoric during the Revolutionary era about the rights of Englishmen, while observing 
that such rhetoric entailed a range of conceptions that varied among states). The proposition in the 
text would still stand if rhetoric about the rights of Englishmen served as a proxy for an emerging 
American consensus that expanded on the English tradition. See id. at 1546. 
 359. See Shadwick, 407 U.S. at 348. 
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search warrants.360 Indeed, Justice Powell referred to the need for a 
“prior judicial judgment,”361 invoking the language of judicial power used 
in Article III. It seems reasonable, therefore, to read Article III in 
tandem with the practice of obtaining a warrant from a neutral 
magistrate that was codified by the Fourth Amendment. 
Although the executive receives more latitude in surveillance of 
non-U.S. persons located abroad and the FAA does not require 
individual warrants, the conflict with Article III is not materially greater 
in the foreign surveillance context. Limiting the executive to targeting 
non-U.S. persons located abroad entails safeguards tailored to overseas 
surveillance. Congress’s judgment on the framework necessary to 
accomplish these goals is worthy of deference. Congress is certainly not 
required to assume a passive role, trusting that the government will not 
use the foreign intelligence rubric to spy on U.S. persons. As Chief 
Justice Roberts noted in his opinion for the Court in Riley, trusting 
solely in internal government “protocols” is a poor substitute for 
independent safeguards.362 Moreover, even when the executive can 
proceed without a warrant, as in a search that is a bona fide effort to 
recover foreign intelligence information, the courts can still assess the 
reasonableness of the search under the Fourth Amendment.363 Congress 
can play a role in codifying basic standards of reasonableness in such 
searches. It would be ironic if the courts, in the name of preserving the 
judicial role under Article III, were to diminish the safeguards that 
Congress put in place to preserve an independent judicial check on 
executive overreaching. 
Justice Powell’s opinion in Keith seemed to echo this concern. 
Justice Powell suggested that a request for court approval of warrants in 
domestic national security cases could go to a “specially designated 
court”364 and that such approval may be governed “in accordance with 
such reasonable standards as the Congress may prescribe.”365 This 
deference would support a robust public advocate with an ongoing role 
in FISC proceedings and the capacity to appeal FISC rulings that the 
advocate deemed to be insufficiently protective of privacy and civil 
liberties.  
If one needed a more concrete basis for requiring participation in 
FISC proceedings by a public advocate, one could also invoke the “next 
friend” doctrine. Courts have repeatedly recognized that a “next friend” 
may invoke the rights of an absent party who meets the Article III 
 
 360. Keith, 407 U.S. at 317 n.18. 
 361. Id. at 317. 
 362. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014). 
 363. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 604 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc). 
 364. Keith, 407 U.S. at 323. 
 365. Id. at 324. 
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requirement of an injury in fact.366 Here, the target of surveillance—the 
real party in interest—surely has an injury in fact, since being subject to 
unwanted surveillance is a substantial government intrusion. The 
Supreme Court has recognized that the “inaccessibility” of the real party 
in interest is a factor in assessing the propriety of next friend status.367 In 
responding to Keith’s invitation, Congress could establish a public 
advocate as an institutional next friend for surveillance targets, who 
cannot be present because notice to them would undermine the purpose 
of surveillance. As a practical matter, surveillance targets are inaccessible 
to the magistrate deciding a warrant request because targets do not 
receive notice. In this sense, targets resemble an individual who is being 
held incommunicado, where courts have indicated that appointment of a 
next friend is appropriate.368 In both cases, the real party in interest 
cannot make its wishes known, and a next friend can act on the 
reasonable presumption that the real party in interest would prefer to be 
free from state coercion or intrusion. Appealing from an adverse 
judgment would simply be another function fulfilled by a next friend 
representing the real party in interest. 
If a congressional framework establishing a public advocate as a 
next friend would be entitled to deference, the modest steps in the Leahy 
bill merit even greater solicitude. The Leahy bill’s requirement that the 
FISC explain in writing why it has failed to appoint amicus curiae is not 
problematic as an interference in matters reserved to courts. Congress 
has, on occasion, required courts to produce writings in connection with 
certain relief. For example, a circuit justice or judge must issue a 
certificate of appealability to permit appeal by criminal defendants of 
final orders denying habeas relief.369 While rules on habeas appeals 
arguably merely govern the substantive rights of the parties, with the 
issuance of the certificate being ancillary to those rights, that distinction 
seems unduly rigid. It is true that appointment of amicus curiae has 
traditionally been viewed as the court’s prerogative. However, Congress 
can modify other powers that courts have traditionally exercised, such as 
the power to grant injunctive relief.370 The writing required by Congress 
here is a far more modest limit on judicial discretion. 
 
 366. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16–17 (D.D.C. 2010) (in the course of holding 
that the father of an alleged overseas target of U.S. government-targeted killing lacked standing to be 
a next friend, the court observed that next friend standing required that the real party in interest meet 
the injury in fact requirement of Article III). 
 367. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163 (1990). 
 368. Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153, 1159–60 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 369. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (2006). 
 370. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008); Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable 
Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 Va. L. Rev. 485 (2010). 
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b. The Public Advocate and the Appointments Clause 
The final problem with a robust public advocate centers on the 
Appointments Clause.371 The Appointments Clause requires that any 
principal officer, such as a cabinet official or ambassador, be appointed 
by the President and confirmed by the Senate, while inferior officers may 
be appointed by the President, the courts, or other executive branch 
officials. To ensure democratic accountability, a principal officer must be 
removable by the President directly, while Congress can provide that an 
inferior officer is removable only by a principal officer and only for good 
cause.372 To ensure maximum independence for a public advocate, 
appointment by the courts as an inferior officer would be preferable. 
Some argue, however, that a public advocate cannot meet the standard 
for inferior officer status. These arguments are misplaced. 
The classic case is Morrison v. Olson, in which the Court held that 
the independent counsel established by Congress in the wake of 
Watergate was an inferior officer whose appointment by the courts and 
insulation from direct removal by the President therefore passed 
constitutional muster.373 Justifying its decision, the Court noted that 
Congress enacted the independent counsel statute because of concern 
about “conflicts of interest” created when the executive branch is 
permitted to investigate itself.374 To ease these conflicts, Congress lodged 
appointing authority in the judiciary.375 However, the Court recognized 
that granting the judiciary appointment authority would be 
unconstitutional if that authority appeared to undermine the judicial role 
or impose responsibilities on the courts that were “incongruous” in light 
of that role. The Court did not regard the courts’ appointment of an 
independent counsel as “incongruous,” even though the independent 
counsel served as a prosecutor who appeared before the courts in 
criminal litigation and took legal positions that the courts were required 
to evaluate.376 Although some have argued that subsequent decisions 
have diluted Morrison’s force,377 those decisions do not deal with checks 
on national security surveillance in the wake of Snowden’s disclosures. 
 
 371. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 372. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 490–91 (2010). 
 373. 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988). 
 374. Id. at 677. 
 375. Id.  
 376. Id.  
 377. See Nolan et al., supra note 41 (citing Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. at 490–
91). See generally Patricia L. Bellia, PCAOB and the Persistence of the Removal Puzzle, 80 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 1371, 1389–1412 (2012) (discussing history and future prospects). But see Steven G. 
Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 
105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153 (1992) (arguing that the Constitution bars limits on the President’s power to 
remove executive branch officials). 
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In establishing a public advocate, Congress would be acting not only 
on Keith’s invitation, but also on the premise that the system in place at 
the time of Snowden’s disclosures did not provide sufficient 
independence from the government’s positions. A public advocate would 
supply a robust institutional check analogous to the independent 
counsel’s service when conflicts of interest disabled regularly appointed 
federal prosecutors. Although the public advocate’s role would be 
ongoing, not the limited and exceptional service provided by the 
independent counsel, that distinction is unimportant. The public 
advocate’s function in promoting independent assessment of the 
government’s position is central to her inferior officer status. Deferring 
to Congress’s determination of the urgency of promoting independent, 
adversarial adjudication of national security surveillance after Snowden 
is of a piece with deference to Congress’s fix for the problem of the 
executive investigating itself in the wake of Watergate. 
C. “About” Collection Under Section 702 
The dynamic conception also illuminates another controversial 
issue: NSA’s collection, under section 702 of the FAA, of the content of 
communications “about” suspected terrorists and others who can provide 
foreign intelligence information. Critics have asserted that this practice, 
which the FISC approved in 2011, stretches to the breaking point the 
“target” language in section 702.378 While the acquisition of information 
under section 702 is not bulk collection, it raises significant issues, 
including whether the NSA should be able to query section 702 data with 
U.S. person identifiers—a concern addressed in the next Subpart. 
Ultimately, however, “about” collection is consistent with the NSA’s 
governing statute. 
According to critics, a “target” is best understood as a person who 
either sends or receives communications.379 That limit on targeting keeps 
collection within manageable bounds, critics contend. Critics worry about 
the scope of “about” collection. Suppose, critics have posited, that the 
NSA defines a communication “about” a given matter as one in which 
that subject is mentioned one or more times in the communication. Using 
this working definition, suppose the NSA targeted all communications 
that mentioned “Al Qaeda” or “Osama bin Laden.” Many people 
around the world, including journalists, academics, and ordinary citizens, 
use such terms in e-mails or phone conversations, without possessing any 
links to terrorism or other activities of foreign intelligence import. For 
critics, defining “target” in section 702 to include this wide set of 
communications about matters of foreign intelligence interest echoes the 
 
 378. See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 8 (manuscript at 58). 
 379. See id.  
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broad definition of relevance that the FISC relied on to justify the 
metadata program under section 215.380 
Even if one accepts the critics’ point about FISC interpretation of 
section 215, the government is on firmer footing here. Collection of 
communications “about” a target is hardly novel under laws dealing with 
foreign intelligence information. Although much targeting aims to collect 
information to or from a particular individual, targeting can encompass 
more. Explaining the meaning of “target” in the original FISA legislation 
in 1978, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
(“HPSCI”) stated that “the target of . . . surveillance is the individual or 
entity about whom or from whom information is sought.”381 As if 
replying to those who might view the term, “target,” in more restrictive 
terms, the House Report advised that, “[i]n most cases this would be the 
person or entity at whom the surveillance is physically directed . . . but 
this is not necessarily so.”382 The Committee evidently believed that, in 
the realm of foreign intelligence collection, the government needed 
further leeway. 
This is unsurprising if one views surveillance abroad as a fiduciary 
activity designed to bridge gaps in knowledge about security risks. That 
knowledge is necessarily imperfect.383 Gaps in knowledge can be 
dangerous, leading to a failure to connect the dots. To guard against this 
failure, a diligent intelligence official will want to know as much as 
possible about the associates and capabilities of a foreign subject. 
Limiting intelligence collection to communications dutifully exchanged 
between a subject and his known associates hinders this objective. The 
diligent analyst will be even more interested in previously unknown 
associates or activities of the subject. Extending collection to 
communications “about” the subject will ferret out this information. 
In “about” collection, tailored criteria for defining the subjects of 
collection are vital, both legally and functionally. Over-inclusive criteria 
may be arbitrary, unduly intrusive on innocent parties, or simply 
counterproductive. For example, collecting messages that include the 
words “Al Qaeda” or “Osama bin Laden” will result in a flood of 
irrelevant information useless to the analyst. To be usable, such a trough 
of information would have to be subjected to additional queries, all of 
which take time and effort. While some analysts, left to their own 
devices, might take this approach, both U.S. domestic law and 
international law require a more targeted strategy.384 That is why the 
NSA uses precise or “strong” selectors, such as e-mail addresses or 
 
 380. Id. 
 381. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 2, at 73 (1978) (emphasis added). 
 382. Id. 
 383. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 32–39 (2010). 
 384. See Margulies, supra note 85, at 2159–60. 
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phone numbers.385 Because of the small set of people with knowledge of 
the e-mail address or phone number of a subject of foreign intelligence 
interest, strong selectors weed out innocent, casual, or inadvertent 
communications. Selectors with this degree of precision guard against 
indiscriminate data collection. 
Critics counter that the “about” collection enhances the risk that the 
NSA will collect purely domestic communications that are outside 
section 702’s scope.386 The NSA collects section 702 data in two forms: 
through specific requests to ISPs and telecommunications companies 
(the PRISM program) and through scanning the contents of buffers for 
international Internet transmissions that comprise part of the Internet’s 
backbone (the Upstream program). “About” collection occurs only in 
the Upstream program.387 Upstream scanning raises the risk of acquiring 
domestic communications that the government could otherwise obtain 
with a traditional warrant. 
The risk of acquiring purely domestic communications stems from 
the architecture of the Internet and the limits of the NSA’s own 
technology. First, consider the problems rooted in Internet architecture. 
Internet communications occur in packets.388 Devices, such as routers, 
that are programmed to manage packet transmission will take the most 
efficient path available to a recipient. Sometimes a router will discover 
that the most efficient path for a particular packet of domestic 
communications lies through equipment typically used by foreign 
nationals. If so, the router will take this path. A U.S. Internet user may 
also change settings in a way that will increase the likelihood that some 
or all of the user’s communications will run through such equipment. 
When the government conducts a scan of the portion of the Internet 
backbone typically used for the transmission of international 
communications, it uses Internet protocol (IP) filters to focus its scan on 
communications in which either the sender or recipient is reasonably 
believed to be located outside the United States.389 The use of IP filters is 
one aspect of the government’s efforts to exercise due diligence in 
avoiding collection of wholly domestic communications.390 However, no 
technology is perfect, and the nature of the Internet architecture means 
that any program that scans international communications at the Internet 
 
 385. PCLOB Section 702 Report, supra note 31, at 32–33. 
 386. See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 8 (manuscript at 58). 
 387. Nat’l Sec. Agency, NSA Director of Civil Liberties and Privacy Office Report: NSA’s 
Implementation of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Section 702 5 (2014) [hereinafter NSA 
Privacy Report]. 
 388. See In re Government’s Ex Parte Submission of Reauthorization Certification for 702 
Program, No. [Redacted], 2011 WL 10945618, at *9–11 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011) (Bates, J.); PCLOB 
Section 702 Report, supra note 31, at 38. 
 389. PCLOB Section 702 Report, supra note 31, at 38. 
 390. Id.  
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backbone stage will acquire some communications in which both sender 
and recipient are either U.S. persons or individuals located in the United 
States. 
In the Upstream program, the interaction of Internet architecture 
and limited collection technology creates an additional risk that the NSA 
will acquire purely domestic communications. Because the Upstream 
collection occurs at the Internet backbone level, the NSA acquires data 
in the form of communications “transactions.”391 A transaction is any set 
of data traversing the Internet that a device combines to facilitate 
transmission. Internet transactions come in two varieties. The first is a 
single communication, such as an e-mail message sent from one server to 
another.392 The second transaction, called a multiple communications 
transaction (“MCT”), contains many discrete communications.393 For 
example, at the Internet backbone level at which the NSA scans for 
Upstream collection, e-mails are typically “bundled together within a 
single Internet transmission.”394  
As of June 2014, the NSA has not been able to design a filter that 
acquires only those discrete e-mails in an MCT that mention a particular 
subject of interest.395 To collect the e-mail that meets its targeting 
criteria, the NSA also must collect entire MCTs, analogous to pages of 
personal e-mails. As with anyone’s e-mail, an entire page will include 
some twenty or thirty messages, typically on disparate subjects with 
different senders. Some MCTs include messages sent between persons 
located in the United States—that is, purely domestic communications.396  
A combination of external and internal constraints addresses this 
problem. The FISC, in its review of the government’s section 702 
certifications, reviews not only the four corners of the written 
certification but also the implementation of government measures to 
minimize use of U.S. person data.397 Congressional committees 
exercising oversight can also inquire about those internal constraints, 
which are extensive and methodical. For example, whenever the NSA 
acquires an MCT that may contain discrete communications between 
persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States, the 
agency will segregate that transaction in an “access-controlled 
repository.”398 Access is limited to analysts trained in identifying 
 
 391. See In re Government’s Ex Parte Submission, 2011 WL 10945618, at *10–11; PCLOB Section 
702 Report, supra note 31, at 39. 
 392. PCLOB Section 702 Report, supra note 31, at 39. 
 393. Id.; see President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Commc’ns Techs., supra note 30, at 141. 
 394. Id. at 141. 
 395. PCLOB Section 702 Report, supra note 31, at 40. 
 396. Id. at 41. 
 397. Id. at 27. 
 398. Id. at 54. 
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domestic communications transactions. If that trained analyst determines 
that the transaction contains a discrete domestic communication, the 
analyst will destroy the entire transaction upon making that 
determination.399  
These constraints are not perfect. As with any procedure, one 
cannot categorically rule out instances of abuse. However, FISC review 
and congressional oversight minimize the likelihood of problems. The 
only other alternative would be to preclude “about” collection. As we 
have seen, however, legislative history and policy point to continuing this 
collection mode. Speculation about implementation issues should not 
trump those arguments, particularly given robust internal and external 
constraints. 
D. Querying Databases for Data Incidentally Collected on U.S. 
Persons 
The third issue that merits discussion is the NSA’s practice of using 
U.S. person identifiers to query certain data collected under section 702. 
Some critics of the NSA have viewed such queries as “back-door 
surveillance” of U.S. persons. Here, too, however, a look at the tailored 
nature of the practices in question eases those concerns, although further 
independent external constraints would enhance the legitimacy of the 
program and respond to the critics. 
The NSA’s authority under the FAA to collect communications 
where a sender or recipient is a U.S. person (as long as the other person 
is not) creates a potential problem. In theory, the NSA has the capacity 
to engage in reverse targeting, framing selectors that it knows would net 
the communications of U.S. persons while using surveillance on non-U.S. 
persons as a convenient pretext.400 This practice is illegal: the statute bars 
collection “where the purpose of targeting somebody outside the United 
States is to target somebody in the United States.”401 However, critics 
have expressed fear that policing that prohibition is difficult. That 
obstacle to enforcing the bar sets the stage for what critics have called 
“back-door targeting” of U.S. persons.402 Resort to back-door targeting 
would be a serious problem, because the absence of a warrant 
 
 399. Id. 
 400. See Donohue, supra note 8 (manuscript at 158–59). 
 401. 154 Cong. Rec. S6181 (daily ed. June 26, 2008) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller); 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1881a(b)(2) (2014). 
 402. That dystopian vision is exactly what led Congress in 2008 to omit the language in the Protect 
America Act of 2007, the FAA’s predecessor, which had permitted collection of content “concerning” 
foreign intelligence. See 154 Cong. Rec. S6471 (daily ed. July 9, 2008) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) 
(observing that, under the previous statute, “[i]f the NSA wanted to get my communications but did 
not want to go to the FISA Court, they might try to figure out who I am talking with and collect the 
content of their calls to get to me.”). 
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requirement under the FAA hinges on one party to a conversation being 
a non-U.S. person reasonably believed to be located abroad. For 
intentional collection on U.S. persons, the government should seek a 
warrant under traditional FISA403 or Title 18.404 Permitting intentional 
collection on a lesser showing undermines constitutional protections for 
U.S. persons. 
The NSA has imposed an internal constraint, which is monitored by 
the FISC and Congress and makes “reverse targeting” far more difficult. 
The section 702 program that would create the highest risk of reverse 
targeting is the Upstream Internet transaction program, since that 
program inadvertently collects a significant amount of U.S. person data 
through fleeting shifts in Internet protocols and MCTs. To guard against 
the risk of reverse targeting, the NSA prohibits the use of U.S. person 
queries with Upstream Internet transaction data.405 
In programs other than Upstream, the NSA queries the content of 
communications with U.S. person identifiers, such as a phone number or 
e-mail address, when such queries would be “reasonably likely to return 
foreign intelligence information.”406 Queries may stem from a list of 
persons already subject to court orders under FISA.407 In such cases, 
surveillance is already authorized under an individualized determination. 
The NSA also requires a layer of internal review before an analyst can 
conduct a query using a U.S. person identifier: the NSA Office of 
General Counsel must approve requests that do not entail queries based 
on a prior FISA court order.408 At the NSA, queries using U.S. person 
identifiers have been relatively modest: 198 were approved in 2013.409  
The CIA can also query content with U.S. person identifiers under a 
similar standard based on the likelihood of returning foreign intelligence 
information.410 A CIA analyst does not need pre-approval from another 
CIA official, but must document in writing why she believes that a 
particular query meets the standard.411 The CIA’s queries may involve 
U.S. persons abroad “engaged in facilitating international terrorism.”412 
That description would cover U.S. persons who have gone abroad to 
fight in Syria or Iraq with groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (“ISIS”), which has taken over a significant amount of territory in 
 
 403. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (b)(2) (2006). 
 404. 18 U.S.C. § 2510-22 (2006). 
 405. NSA Privacy Report, supra note 387, at 7. 
 406. NSA Minimization Procedures § 3(b)(6) (2011); NSA Privacy Report, supra note 387, at 7; 
PCLOB Section 702 Report, supra note 31, at 57. 
 407. PCLOB Section 702 Report, supra note 31, at 57. 
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those two countries and which the United States has designated as a 
terrorist group. In 2013, the CIA conducted 1,900 content queries of 
section 702 data with U.S. person identifiers. That is substantially more 
queries than the NSA performed, although the number is still low 
enough to suggest that the CIA’s queries have been consistent with the 
legal standard. 
Current legislation does not preclude the government’s use of U.S. 
person identifiers in the circumstances just described. The statute 
prohibits the government from “intentionally” targeting a person 
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States when “the 
purpose” of this acquisition of data is the targeting of an individual 
reasonably believed to be in the United States.413 The terms 
“intentionally” and “the purpose” should be construed narrowly. 
Similarly, the term, “target,” should be construed to include the element 
of intent on the part of the analyst doing the query. 
A staple of legal discourse on states of mind is the difference 
between intent and knowledge; intent (along with purpose) refers to a 
conscious aim, while knowledge merely means awareness of a fact. 
Countless statutes reflect this distinction, including those that make 
criminal responsibility or sentencing contingent on a given state of mind. 
Congress should be credited with knowing the difference when it enacted 
section 702. The term, “the purpose,” is also contrasted with a broader 
phrase, like “a purpose.” Use of the definite article refers to a particular 
thing, not one of many. Congress was quite familiar with this distinction 
when it enacted the FAA, since the USA Patriot Act had changed the 
language in a different FISA provision from “the purpose” to “a 
significant purpose” to allow greater information sharing between 
intelligence agencies and federal law enforcement in the wake of the 
failure to connect the dots of the 9/11 plot.414 
The definition of “target” includes an element of intent. The 
dictionary definition of the transitive verb “target” describes the word as 
an effort “to make a target of” or “to direct or use toward a target.”415 
Verbs like “make” and “direct” connote a deliberate goal. The legislative 
history of the original FISA reinforces this point. As previously noted, 
the HPSCI, in its report on the original 1978 FISA legislation, stated that 
“the target . . . is the individual or entity about whom . . . information is 
 
 413. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(2) (2014). 
 414. See id. § 1804(a)(6)(B) (2014); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 723–32 (FISA Ct. Rev. Sept. 
9, 2002). That provision allowed the FISC to authorize a FISA warrant on a showing that gathering 
foreign intelligence information was “a significant purpose” of the request. It replaced the more 
demanding test, imposed by earlier courts interpreting the former term, “the purpose,” that gathering 
foreign intelligence information, not criminal investigation, was the government’s “primary purpose” 
in seeking a FISA warrant. Id. 
 415. See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1278 (11th ed. 2003).  
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sought.”416 Information or any other commodity that is “sought” is 
consciously desired by the seeker.417 
The path to enactment taken by the FAA also meshes with these 
definitions. During the debate in the House of Representatives on the 
FAA, Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Democrat of Texas, offered an 
amendment that had earlier been stripped from the bill. That 
amendment required a traditional FISA warrant whenever a “significant 
purpose of an acquisition is to acquire the communications of a specific 
person reasonably believed to be located in the United States.”418 
Representative Jackson Lee’s amendment would have expanded the 
meaning of the term “purpose” by removing the definite article “the” 
that immediately precedes it, and adding the adjective, “significant,” 
which could apply to one of a number of goals, not a single primary 
objective. Because of the NSA’s mission, it will typically have some 
interest in uncovering the identities of Americans whose identifiers 
appear in section 702 data. That interest would have run afoul of 
Representative Jackson Lee’s amendment. If the amendment had been 
adopted, it would have curbed the NSA’s ability to collect 
communications of foreign intelligence interest in which one party was a 
U.S. person. However, the amendment failed in the House, leaving intact 
the language in the final legislation. Congress’s refusal to include 
Representative Jackson Lee’s amendment in the final bill suggests that 
Congress did not want to unduly hinder the NSA’s collection authority. 
Policy factors echo this analysis. Selectors that are effective under 
section 702 will precisely identify targets of foreign intelligence interest, 
including foreign terrorist groups or officials in governments that sponsor 
terrorism. Devising selectors to achieve this goal is section 702’s driving 
purpose. As discussed in the previous Subpart, sloppy selectors that took 
in U.S. person data would ill serve this objective. Admittedly, in some 
cases the analyst who frames a precise selector may know that such 
collection will also net data about a U.S. person. However, that factor 
should not in itself limit collection on a valid non-U.S. target. This 
prohibition would perpetuate gaps in intelligence, instead of closing 
them. It would also penalize an analyst for knowing more about a non-
U.S. subject’s contacts, if those contacts happen to include U.S. persons. 
Encouraging analysts to know less impairs efficient collection of data 
about national security threats. 
That said, the government’s current criteria for use of U.S. person 
identifiers on section 702 could benefit from further legislative guidance. 
 
 416. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 2, at 73 (1978). 
 417. The term, “sought,” is the past participle of the verb, “seek,” which Merriam-Webster’s 
Dictionary defines as, “to try to discover” or “to try to acquire or gain.” To “try” to achieve something 
also connotes a conscious aim. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1124 (11th ed. 2003).  
 418. 154 Cong. Rec. H5740 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee) (emphasis added). 
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Guidance from Congress could clear up one area of inconsistency within 
NSA’s own criteria, involving the use of identifiers to gather information 
about threats to life. It could also refine areas where the use of U.S. 
person identifiers serves foreign intelligence goals, including aggregating 
information about conduct abroad on behalf of a foreign terrorist 
organization, participation in a transnational criminal enterprise, and 
espionage. 
Consider first the status of “threats to life” as a basis for framing 
U.S. person queries of section 702 data. The NSA’s own example—
hostage situations—does not fit the NSA’s stated criteria of a query that 
is “reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information.”419 At 
first blush, this argument about the inconsistency of gathering 
information about hostage situations with the NSA’s criteria for use of 
U.S. person identifiers may seem counterintuitive. Who, after all, could 
argue with gathering as much information as possible to deal with such 
exigencies? In policy terms, the NSA’s position may well be the right call. 
However, it poses tensions with the NSA’s own criteria for using U.S. 
person identifiers. 
To see why, consider three common examples of hostage situations. 
A typical U.S. hostage situation involves a bank robbery gone wrong or 
an episode of domestic violence, in which a batterer holds an intimate 
partner or a child hostage after the police arrive. In this situation, foreign 
involvement is not likely; indeed, it is rare. A query in this case would be 
largely precautionary in nature, obviating the remote possibility of 
foreign involvement. Next, consider a hostage situation abroad. Here, 
the victim might be a U.S. person, but it is uncertain whether a section 
702 query based on the U.S. victim’s discrete identifiers would yield 
foreign intelligence information, unless the victim had engaged in prior 
communications with her captors or the captors engaged in 
communication about the victim. The latter instance (of kidnappers 
mentioning the victim) is possible, but would only be “likely” if the 
analyst making the query knew more, such as whether the government’s 
section 702 data included surveillance of the foreign individual or group 
responsible for the kidnapping. The return of foreign intelligence 
information would also be likely where a U.S. person takes 
hostages abroad, but this is exceedingly infrequent. Here, too, knowing 
more might change the calculus; if a group like ISIS took hostages, it is 
possible that further information would be available from querying 
identifiers associated with U.S. persons known to have joined the group. 
Even here, however, it is not necessarily “likely” that such a query would 
return foreign intelligence information, since U.S. persons who have 
joined the group might have no knowledge of the kidnapping. This does 
 
 419. NSA Privacy Report, supra note 387, at 7. 
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not mean that Congress should bar such queries in hostage situations, but 
it does call attention to the lack of fit between the NSA’s current stated 
criteria and its own examples. 
Remedying the problems with NSA’s use of U.S. person identifiers 
is more challenging. Two current proposals—one by Representative Zoe 
Lofgren of California, which the House of Representatives has approved, 
and one by Chair David Medine and former D.C. Circuit judge Patricia 
Wald of the PCLOB—illustrate the difficulties plaguing proposed 
solutions. 
Consider first the amendment to the Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act offered by Representative Lofgren.420 The Lofgren 
Amendment would bar using federal funds “to query a collection of 
foreign intelligence information acquired under section 702 . . . using a 
United States person identifier.”421 The only exception in the 
amendment is for identifiers connected to traditional FISA warrants and 
other ex ante court orders authorizing surveillance. 
The Lofgren Amendment paints with an unduly broad brush. It 
does not allow queries based on U.S. persons who are involved with 
hostage situations. Even though this query does not readily fit with the 
NSA’s current criteria, barring it altogether would be counterproductive. 
In exigent cases, the NSA should have the ability to frame queries that 
may save lives. The Constitution presents no bar since courts have 
regularly approved searches under exigent circumstances.422 Nor does 
the use of U.S. person queries in hostage situations clash with section 
702’s bar on targeting U.S. persons, since the queries concern evidence 
already acquired through the targeting of persons reasonably believed to 
be outside the United States.423 
Moreover, the government may well have the need to seek other 
information regarding U.S. persons that could be included in lawful 
collection under section 702 and might be difficult to acquire through 
other means. For example, the government might intercept 
communications sent or received by an ISIS operative in Syria or Iraq, 
and might wish to know if the ISIS operative mentioned any U.S. persons 
who are currently abroad fighting on ISIS’s behalf or might wish to go 
abroad for this purpose. It is true that the government might be able to 
secure a traditional FISA warrant once it determined that someone had 
taken concrete steps to join ISIS’s fighting force, since that would make 
that individual an “agent of a foreign power” who could be targeted 
 
 420. See 160 Cong. Rec. H5544 (daily ed. June 19, 2014). 
 421. Id. 
 422. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014); Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011). 
 423. See United States v. Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, 2014 WL 2866749, at *26 (D. Ore. 
June 24, 2014) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not bar U.S. person queries of section 702 
information that has been lawfully acquired). 
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under the statute.424 However, in a particular case, such as one in which a 
U.S. person who had fought with ISIS was about to board a plane to 
return to the United States, time might be of the essence. In such a case, 
the government may not have received sufficient notice of that 
individual’s ISIS involvement to allow for the completion of a traditional 
FISA application. Under these circumstances, it would be appropriate to 
authorize a query of a section 702 database. The Lofgren Amendment 
also fails to address this situation. 
Another flawed fix is the proposal by Chairman Medine and Judge 
Wald of the PCLOB. That proposal requires ex ante judicial review of 
NSA queries to ensure that they are “reasonably likely to return foreign 
intelligence information.”425 This proposal is superior to the Lofgren 
Amendment because it has an appropriately deferential substantive 
standard. Moreover, a larger FISC role is useful.426 In addition, Medine 
and Wald outlined an intriguing alternative, entailing FISC appointment 
of a special master who could review a “representative sample of query 
results” and make recommendations to the court.427 The major flaw in 
the Medine and Wald proposal is its differential standard for the NSA 
and the FBI. Under the proposal, the test for the FBI, as assessed ex ante 
by the FISC in all but exigent circumstances, would be whether the U.S. 
person query is “reasonably likely to return information relevant to an 
assessment or investigation of a crime.”428 The NSA’s test is whether the 
query is “reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information.”429 
The differing criteria for FBI and NSA queries could hamper intelligence 
sharing between the two agencies, replicating the failures of the “wall” 
that existed between agencies prior to September 11.430 
The better course for Congress would be to offer an itemized, but 
not exhaustive, list of permissible uses of U.S. person identifiers. 
Congress could permit U.S. person queries in cases involving pre-existing 
FISA orders, threats to life, efforts to join international terrorist groups 
(the ISIS example), and other transnational illegal activity. This list 
would not categorically bar other uses of U.S. person identifiers, allowing 
some room for those uses when compelling circumstances arise. 
 
 424. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (2006). 
 425. See PCLOB Section 702 Report, supra note 31, at 157–58. 
 426. See id. at 158 (citing Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491) (observing that the Founders favored 
independent ex ante review of government searches, and “did not fight a revolution to gain the right to 
government agency protocols”). 
 427. Id. at 157 n.567. 
 428. Id. at 138, 159.  
 429. NSA Privacy Report, supra note 387, at 7. 
 430. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 734–36 (FISA Ct. Rev. Sept. 9, 2002) (upholding the 
statutory change that tore down the wall by permitting the prosecution to use information acquired 
through a FISA warrant when gathering foreign intelligence information was “significant” but not the 
“primary” purpose of the warrant). 
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However, it would frame the substantive discussion in a useful way, and 
send a signal to the FISC and the executive branch that deliberation on 
the scope of U.S. person queries was vital. 
A set of guidelines like those suggested would also compensate for 
the broader latitude that the NSA has for incidental collection under 
section 702. In cases that comprise the basis for the incidental collection 
doctrine, a federal judge had already issued a warrant based on probable 
cause to believe that wrongdoing had occurred.431 That is not the case 
with section 702, where the FISC merely reviews government targeting 
procedures.432 The latitude permitted under section 702 gives the 
government more room to frame initial searches to ensnare Americans. 
Critics have surely exaggerated the government’s ability to engage in 
reverse targeting. Evidence that the NSA has engaged in such practices is 
slim to nonexistent. However, a dynamic approach that adjusts to the 
post-Snowden climate should not treat the absence of reported abuse as 
a recipe for complacency. Instead, this is the appropriate time to put in 
place safeguards that will avoid abuse in the future. 
External constraints should be optimal for providing flexibility while 
ensuring checks on potential abuse. As in other situations, a public 
advocate should receive notice of the NSA’s use of U.S. person 
identifiers to query section 702 data. Once a statutory standard is in 
place, the advocate should be able to seek FISC review of any identifier 
when a reasonable possibility exists that the use of the identifier does not 
comply with Congress’s formulation. This review would be ex post, to 
avoid chilling the agency’s discretion in exigent situations. Ex post review 
would still be meaningful, given the NSA’s status as a repeat player 
dependent on the FISC’s continued good will. External constraints of 
this kind would assure critics that substantive standards were being 
followed. This external check is essential in the post-Snowden climate, in 
which internal “protocols” have—perhaps to a fault—become objects of 
corrosive cynicism. 
Conclusion 
 A reform like an institutionalized public advocate’s office 
exemplifies the fiduciary aspect of surveillance that this Article has 
propounded. In acting as a fiduciary, the executive must address all 
facets of information gathering that evolve over time: the changing threat 
 
 431. See United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 157–58 (1974) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
did not require the exclusion of evidence obtained by incidental collection pursuant to a warrant on an 
alleged bookmaker); United States v. Schwartz, 535 F.2d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 1976) (affirming the 
conviction of a disbarred lawyer for drug trafficking based, inter alia, on a conversation recorded 
pursuant to a warrant on a telephone in another person’s apartment). 
 432. See PCLOB Section 702 Report, supra note 31, at 153–54 (separate statements of Chairman 
Medine and Judge Wald).  
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environment, technology’s capacity for intrusion, technological 
safeguards, and perceptions of legitimacy. The frameworks enacted by 
Congress in section 215 and section 702 and reenacted thereafter have 
space for each, but changes in both provisions are necessary. 
Prior to Edward Snowden’s revelations, section 215’s relevance 
standard functioned as a compromise, with restrictions on use limiting 
the intrusiveness of wide collection. To give the President more 
information about ever-changing threats, the FISC authorized broad 
acquisition of non-content metadata. The FISC made NSA collection 
conditional on the use of a narrowly tailored set of RAS-approved 
identifiers. Those protections leveraged technological safeguards, such as 
automated search protocols that courts also use in Fourth Amendment 
cases. The involvement of Congress and the courts addressed legitimacy 
concerns, although the outcry after Snowden’s disclosures showed that 
more needed to be done. An institutionalized public advocate would be a 
down-payment on that debt. 
The secrecy surrounding the metadata program exacerbated critics’ 
legitimacy concerns, although here secrecy functioned in the way that the 
Framers had favored: secrecy enhanced strategic advantages and 
expanded deliberation to include approaches that disclosure would have 
removed from consideration. Between 2009 and June 2013, secrecy did 
not impede the FISC’s ability to enforce the program’s trade-offs 
between broad coverage and restricted access. It remains to be seen 
whether the movement toward new legislation on section 215, including 
the version of the USA Freedom Act passed by the House in May 2014, 
will strike the right balance between effectiveness and checks against 
abuse. 
In the wake of Snowden’s disclosure, even greater attention should 
be paid to the dual values of tailoring government access to information 
and ensuring the right mix of external and internal constraints. Those 
dual values should inform assessment of substantive changes to section 
215, as well as operation of section 702. A new requirement under 
section 215 of a “specific selection term” related to a foreign power or 
agent of a foreign power may be welcome as a codification of the limited 
identifiers used by NSA. Defining that specific selection term, as the 
Leahy bill does, to include a “personal device” is appropriate, although 
courts must not impose an unduly narrow interpretation that limits 
government access to information that has previously been available by 
subpoena in ordinary criminal prosecutions. Under section 702, “about” 
collection is appropriate, given the need for government access to 
information on subjects involving international terrorism and other 
matters of foreign intelligence interest. “About” collection does not 
undermine the privacy rights of U.S. persons or others around the world, 
as long as the FISC, aided by a robust public advocate, can consider ex 
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post whether the selectors used are sufficiently tailored to the task. The 
use of U.S. person identifiers to query section 702 data raises additional 
issues. Here, too, a public advocate can assist the FISC. Congress should 
also provide greater guidance on identifiers, articulating categories such 
as relevance to international terrorism. These reforms will protect 
privacy and enhance the legitimacy of surveillance programs, without 
sacrificing their effectiveness. 
The Leahy bill introduced in July of 2014 enhances external 
constraints on the NSA, but its reliance on amici curiae and certification 
will not be as effective as a robust public advocate. Amici curiae must be 
appointed by the FISC, which has signaled that it regards a voice 
opposing the government as disruptive and inefficient. Certification is a 
procedure that the Supreme Court has resisted for decades. While 
certification complies with Article III, it may not yield the meaningful 
review that the Leahy bill’s drafters intended. A robust public advocate 
appointed by the judiciary with an ongoing role in FISC proceedings 
would be consistent with both Article III and the Appointments Clause, 
given the deference to Congress shown in Keith and Morrison v. Olson. 
Snowden’s revelations have reshaped national security surveillance 
and data collection. Those disclosures impaired the United States’ ability 
to adjust to shifting terrorist threats. However, the debate fostered by 
Snowden’s unauthorized actions has also provided an opportunity for 
deliberation about the interaction of technology, secrecy, and national 
security. 
Tailoring and the optimal mix of external and internal constraints 
can build a stable framework for necessary surveillance in an uncertain 
world. We should not squander that opportunity. 
